Description

Book Synopsis
This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.



Table of Contents
Hervé Moulin: Foreword.- Walter Trockel: In Lieu of an Introduction: How I Remember Leonid Hurwicz.- Part I: Institution Design: Thomas Marschak and Dong Wei: Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty.- Roger B. Myerson: Fundamental Theory of Institutions: a Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz.- Andrew Postlewaite and David Schmeidler: The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future.- Fernando Vega-Redondo: Social Networks from a Designer's Viewpoint.- Part II: Design Under Uncertainties: Claude d' Aspremont and Jacques Crémer: Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design.- Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Andrew Postelwaite: Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments.- John O. Ledyard: Design of Tradable Permit Programs Under Imprecise Measurement.- Tatsuyoshi Saijo: Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design.- Part III: Markets: Peter J. Hammond: Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities.- Yakar Kannai and Roberto C. Raimondo: The Role of (quasi) Analyticity in Establishing Completeness of Financial Markets Equilibria.- Matthew Van Essen and Mark Walker: Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium.- Part IV: Rules: Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan and Arunava Sen: Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules.- William Thomson: Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims.- Part V: Implementation: Bhaskar Dutta: Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information.- Paul H. Edelman and John A. Weymark: Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions.- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Self-Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium.- Part VI: New Directions in Design: Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno: Domains Admitting ex post Incentive Compatible and Respectful Mechanisms: a Characterization for the Two Alternatives Case.- Gabrielle Demange: Mechanisms in a Digitalized World.- Jonathan Chiu and Thorsten Koeppl: Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain.- Pierfrancesco La Mura: Contextual Mechanism Design.


Social Design: Essays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz

    Product form

    £113.99

    Includes FREE delivery

    RRP £119.99 – you save £6.00 (5%)

    Order before 4pm today for delivery by Wed 1 Jul 2026.

    A Hardback by Walter Trockel

    1 in stock

      Trusted by thousands of customers. See 2,385+ Customer Reviews

      View other formats and editions of Social Design: Essays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz by Walter Trockel

      Publisher: Springer International Publishing AG
      Publication Date: 13/06/2019
      ISBN13: 9783319938080, 978-3319938080
      ISBN10: 3319938088
      Also in:
      Economic theory and philosophy Game theory

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.



      Table of Contents
      Hervé Moulin: Foreword.- Walter Trockel: In Lieu of an Introduction: How I Remember Leonid Hurwicz.- Part I: Institution Design: Thomas Marschak and Dong Wei: Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty.- Roger B. Myerson: Fundamental Theory of Institutions: a Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz.- Andrew Postlewaite and David Schmeidler: The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future.- Fernando Vega-Redondo: Social Networks from a Designer's Viewpoint.- Part II: Design Under Uncertainties: Claude d' Aspremont and Jacques Crémer: Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design.- Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Andrew Postelwaite: Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments.- John O. Ledyard: Design of Tradable Permit Programs Under Imprecise Measurement.- Tatsuyoshi Saijo: Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design.- Part III: Markets: Peter J. Hammond: Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities.- Yakar Kannai and Roberto C. Raimondo: The Role of (quasi) Analyticity in Establishing Completeness of Financial Markets Equilibria.- Matthew Van Essen and Mark Walker: Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium.- Part IV: Rules: Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan and Arunava Sen: Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules.- William Thomson: Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims.- Part V: Implementation: Bhaskar Dutta: Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information.- Paul H. Edelman and John A. Weymark: Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions.- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Self-Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium.- Part VI: New Directions in Design: Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno: Domains Admitting ex post Incentive Compatible and Respectful Mechanisms: a Characterization for the Two Alternatives Case.- Gabrielle Demange: Mechanisms in a Digitalized World.- Jonathan Chiu and Thorsten Koeppl: Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain.- Pierfrancesco La Mura: Contextual Mechanism Design.


      Recently viewed products

      © 2026 Book Curl

        • American Express
        • Apple Pay
        • Diners Club
        • Discover
        • Google Pay
        • Maestro
        • Mastercard
        • PayPal
        • Shop Pay
        • Union Pay
        • Visa

        Login

        Forgot your password?

        Don't have an account yet?
        Create account