Description
Book SynopsisDuring the 1980s, economic theory has been revolutionised by game theory. The game theory approach is now very widely used throughout the profession and has become a major tool for the construction of new economic models. It is the basic tool in the construction of a modern theory of industrial organisation and it has led to important developments in finance, labour economics and international trade. This major new collection - prepared by a leading international authority - is oriented towards researchers, professors and graduate students who are interested in the interface between game theory and economic theory. They include the seminal and most important recent papers on the development and application of game theory in economics.
Table of ContentsContents: Acknowledgements • Introduction Part I: Evolution 1. Michihiro Kandori, George J. Mailath and Rafael Rob (1993), ‘Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games’ 2. H. Peyton Young (1993), ‘The Evolution of Conventions’ 3. Glenn Ellison (1993), ‘Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination’ 4. Daniel Friedman (1991), ‘Evolutionary Games in Economics’ Part II: Implementation Theory 5. Dilip Abreau and Hitoshi Matsushima (1992), ‘Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information’ 6. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), ‘Subgame Perfect Implementation’ 7. Matthew O. Jackson (1991), ‘Bayesian Implementation’ Part III: Learning 8. Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer (1993), ‘Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium’ 9. Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps (1993), ‘Learning Mixed Equilibria’ 10. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1991), ‘Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games’ Part IV: Rationalizability 11. B. Douglas Bernheim (1984), ‘Rationalizable Strategic Behavior’ 12. Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel (1987), ‘Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria’ 13. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990), ‘Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities’ Part V: Repeated Games 14. Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin (1990), ‘Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games’ 15. Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Eric Maskin (1994), ‘The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information’ 16. Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin (1989), ‘Renegotiation in Repeated Games’ Part VI: Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 17. Faruk Gul (1989), ‘Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value’ 18. Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell (1996), ‘Bargaining and Value’ 19. Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny (1994), ‘A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core’ Name Index
