Description
Book SynopsisThe modern microprocessor based electronic equipment most vulnerable to Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Interferences (IDEI) includes High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) in all substation equipment. However, power equipment and especially transformers are also subject to the influence of HEMP.
Trade Review'This book provides background information on EMP and practical solutions for protecting power networks ... There are a variety of interesting protection circuits discussed and many interesting photos of unusual power distribution equipment and test equipment'
IEEE, October 2017Table of ContentsAbout the Author ix
Preface xi
1 Technical Progress and Its Consequences 1
1.1 Technical Progress in Relay Protection 12
1.2 Microprocessors – The Basis of the Contemporary Stage of Technical Progress 14
1.3 Smart Grid – A Dangerous Vector of ‘Technical Progress’ in Power Engineering 15
1.4 Dangerous Trends in the Development of Relay Protection Equipment 16
References 22
2 Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Threats 25
2.1 Introduction 25
2.2 A Brief Historical Background 25
2.3 The First Reliable Information on HEMP as Well as Protection Methods in the Field of Electrical Power Engineering 26
2.4 The Actual Situation with Respect to the Protection of Power Electrical Systems from HEMP and other Types of Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Threats 27
2.5 Medium and Short-Range Missile Systems – Potential Sources of Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Threats that Anti-Missile Defence Systems Are Powerless to Defend Against 30
2.6 What is Needed to Actually Defend the Country Against an ‘Electromagnetic Armageddon’? 34
2.7 The Classification and Specifics of High Power Electromagnetic Threats 35
2.8 The Effect of HPEM on Microprocessor-based Relay Protection Systems 53
2.9 The Principle Technical Standards in the HEMP Field 56
References 59
3 Methods and Techniques of Protecting DPR from EMP 65
3.1 The Sensitivity of DPR to Electromagnetic Threats 65
3.2 Methods of Protection from HEMP 68
References 69
4 Passive Methods and Techniques of Protecting DPR from EMP 71
4.1 Cabinets 71
4.2 The Earthing of Sensitive Electronic Apparatus 72
4.3 HEMP Filters 80
4.3.1 Ferrite Filters 80
4.3.2 LC Section-based Filters 87
4.4 Non-linear Overvoltage Limiters 94
4.5 Shielding of the Control Cables 99
4.6 Design Changes to DPR 105
4.6.1 Analogue Input Points 105
4.6.2 Discrete Input Points 106
4.6.3 Output Relays 107
4.6.4 Printed Boards 108
4.7 Construction Materials 109
References 112
5 Active Methods and Techniques of Protecting DPR from EMP 113
5.1 A New Principle in the Active Protection of DPR 113
5.2 Current and Voltage Sensors with Regulated Pickup Threshold based on Reed Switches 122
5.3 Technical and Economic Aspects Affecting the Active Methods of Protecting DPR 128
5.4 Protecting the Circuit Breaker Remote Control System 141
References 146
6 Testing the DPR Immunity to HPEM 149
6.1 An Analysis of Sources of HPEM 149
6.2 The Parameters of Testing DPR on Immunity to HEMP 153
6.3 The Parameters for Testing Immunity to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) 154
6.4 Testing Equipment for Testing Immunity to HPEM 155
6.5 Use of the Performance Criteria During Testing of Electronic Apparatus for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) 166
6.6 The Idiosyncrasies of using Performance Criteria during Testing of Microprocessor Based Relay Protection Devices for their Immuinity to HPEM 167
6.7 A critique of the Method of Testing of the DPR Used in [6.16- 168
6.8 An Analysis of the Results of the Second Independent Test of a DPR of the Same Type 170
6.9 Conclusions and Recommendations for Testing Microprocessor Based Protective Relays 173
References 174
7 Administrative and Technical Measures to Protect DPR from EMP 177
7.1 Problems with the Standardization of DPR 177
7.1.1 Who Coordinates the Process of Standardization in the Field of Relay Protection? 177
7.1.2 The Fundamental Principles of the Standardization of DPR 179
7.2 The Fundamental Principles for the Standardization of DPR Testing 189
7.2.1 A New Look at the Problem 190
7.2.2 Modern Testing Systems to Test Protective Relays 192
7.2.3 The Problems with Modern Protective Relay Testing Systems 193
7.2.4 A Proposed Solution to the Problem 194
7.3 Establishment of Reserves of Electronic Equipment Replacement Modules as a Way to Improve the Survivability of the Power System 195
7.3.1 Optimizing the Capacity of Reserves of Replacement Modules 195
7.3.2 The Problem of Storing SPTA Reserves 196
References 202
8 Protecting High-Power Electrical Equipment from EMP 205
8.1 The Magneto-Hydrodynamic Effect of HEMP 205
8.2 The Influence of the E3 HEMP Component on High-Power Electrical Equipment 207
8.3 Protection of High-Power Equipment from the Impact of Geo-Magnetically Induced Currents (GIC) 208
References 216
Appendix: EMP and its Impact on the Power System 217
Index 223
