Description
Book SynopsisThis two-volume set brings together for the first time a collection of seminal writings dealing with the development of competition policy in Europe, the United States and Japan. It begins by reproducing the writings of leading philosophers and scholars on the rationale and desirability of competition in market economies. These interpretations range in time of origin from ancient Greece through to Adam Smith and James Madison to very recent contributions in the competition policy debate. Having established relevant philosophical foundations, the compendium presents analyses by leading British, American, German and Japanese scholars on the interpretation and administration of laws concerning price-fixing and other restrictive agreements, market dominance and monopolization, predatory practices and mergers.
Trade Review'The collection will no doubt prove a valuable source for students and researchers interested in the history and development of monopoly and competition policy.' -- Morten Hviid, International Journal of Industrial Organization'. . . this book serves a valuable purpose by bringing so much of the conventional literature into one location.'– Michael Perelman, RRPE
Table of ContentsCONTENTS VOLUME 1 PART 1 THE GOALS OF COMPETITION POLICY A SEMINAL VIEWS 1. ‘The Case of Monopolies’, (1907) 2. Adam Smith, ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’ 3. James Madison (1961), ‘The Federalist No. 10’ 4. Arthur T. Hadley (1887), ‘Private Monopolies and Public Rights’ 5. Richard T. Ely (1887), ‘The Future of Corporations’ 6. Alfred Marshall (1890), ‘Some Aspects of Competition: Presidential Address Delivered to the Economic Science and Statistics Section of the British Association, at Leeds, 1890’ 7. John Bates Clark (1900), ‘Trusts’ 8. Henry C. Simons (1936), ‘The Requisites of Free Competition’ B EXCESSIVE COMPETITION CONCERNS 9. Robert Liefmann (1915), ‘Monopoly or Competition as the Basis of a Government Trust Policy’ 10. Eliot Jones (1920), ‘Is Competition in Industry Ruinous’ 11. Kojiro Niino (1962), ‘The Logic of Excessive Competition - With Reference to the Japanese Inter-firm Competition’ 12. Ryutaro Komiya (1990), ‘The Japanese Economy: Trade, Industry and Government’ C THE GOALS DEBATE REDUX 13. Robert H. Bork (1966), ‘Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act’ 14. Robert H. Lande (1989), ‘Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust’ 15. Richard A. Posner (1975), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’ 16. William S .Comanor and Robert H. Smiley (1975), ‘Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth’ 17. James C. Miller III, Thomas F. Walton, William E. Kovacic and Jeremy A. Rabkin (1984), ‘Industrial Policy: Reindustrialization Through Competition or Coordinated Action?’ PART 2 POLICY TOWARD RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS 18. (1926), ‘Against the Corn Dealers’ 19. Dr Kurt Bloch (1932), ‘On German Cartels’ 20. Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (1980), ‘Competition Policy and Antitrust: Some Comparative Observations’ 21. David B. Audretsch (1989), ‘Legalized Cartels in West Germany’ 22. Klaus Stegemann (1977), ‘The Exemption of Specialization Agreements: As Proposed for Stage II Amendments to the Combines Investigation Act’ 23. James P. Cairns (1964), ‘Benefits from Restrictive Agreements: The British Experience’ 24. R. W. Shaw and S. A. Shaw (1983), ‘Excess Capacity and Rationalisation in the West European Synthetic Fibres Industry’ 25. Merton J. Peck, Richard C. Levin and Akira Goto (1988), ‘Picking Losers: Public Policy Toward Declining Industries in Japan’ 26. William H. Nicholls (1949), ‘The Tobacco Case of 1946’ 27. Jesse W. Markham (1951), ‘The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership’ 28. Peter Asch and Joseph J. Seneca (1975), ‘Characteristics of Collusive Firms’ VOLUME 2 PART 1 MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSIVE PRACTICES A DOMINANT ENTERPRISES IN THE UNITED STATES 1. Charles J. Bullock (1901), ‘Trust Literature: A Survey and A Criticism’ 2. F. M. Scherer (1987), ‘Antitrust, Efficiency and Progress’ 3. George W. Stocking and Willard F. Mueller (1955), ‘The Cellophane Case and the New Competition’ 4. Oliver E. Williamson (1972), ‘Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations’ B INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 5. Erich Kaufer (1980), ‘The Control of the Abuse of Market Power by Market-Dominant Firms Under the German Law Against Restraints of Competition’ 6. Eleanor M. Fox (1986), ‘Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity and Fairness’ 7. Richard E. Caves (1974), ‘International Trade, International Investment and Imperfect Markets’ C PREDATORY PRACTICES 8. L. G. Telser (1966), ‘Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse’ 9. B. S. Yamey (1972), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments’ 10. Malcolm R. Burns (1986), ‘Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors’ 11. Oliver E. Williamson (1977), ‘Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis’ 12. William J. Baumol (1979), ‘Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention Pricing’ PART 2 MERGER POLICY 13. George J. Stigler (1950), ‘Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger’ 14. George Bittlingmayer (1985), ‘Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?’ 15. Shaw Livermore (1935), ‘The Success of Industrial Mergers’ 16. Jürgen Müller (1976), ‘The Impact of Mergers on Concentration: A Study of Eleven West German Industries’ 17. David M.Barton and Roger Sherman (1984), ‘The Price and Profit Effects of Horizontal Merger: A Case Study’ 18. Henry G. Manne (1965), ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ 19. Richard E. Caves (1989), ‘Mergers, Takeovers and Economic Efficiency: Foresight vs Hindsight’ 20. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’ 21. Alexis Jacquemin (1990), ‘Horizontal Concentration and European Merger Policy’ 22. William M.Landes and Richard A.Posner (1981), ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’ 23. George J. Stigler and Robert A. Sherwin (1985), ‘The Extent of the Market’ 24. U.S .Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1984) PART 3 THE ADMINISTRATION OF COMPETITION POLICY 25. William Breit and Kenneth G. Elzinga (1974), ‘Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages’ 26. F. M. Scherer (1990), ‘Sunlight and Sunset at the Federal Trade Commission’
