Description
Book SynopsisIs military power central in determining which states get their voice heard in international affairs? The exercise of force is costly, so states often have trouble persuading their opponents that they would resort to arms unless their demands are met. In this book, Slantchev examines just how effective military threats are.
Trade Review'This book is an impressive display of intellectual firepower. It will be required reading for anyone interested in crisis bargaining or deterrence.' R. Harrison Wagner, University of Texas, Austin
'Military Threats offers the most comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of crisis bargaining and escalation I know. Full of new insights and intuitions, this book defines the cutting edge of research in one of the most important areas of formal work on war, that of endogenizing the distribution of power.' Robert Powell, Robson Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
Table of ContentsPart I. Coercion and Credibility: 1. Introduction; 2. Commitment and signalling in coercive bargaining; Part II. A Theory of Military Threats: 3. A model of military threats; 4. Comparing the instruments of coercion; Part III. Elements of Militarized Deterrence: 5. Militarization and the distribution of power and interests; 6. The expansion of the Korean War, 1950; 7. The price of peace and military threat effectiveness; Part IV. Conclusions: 8. Implications; Appendix A. Formalities for Chapter 2; Appendix B. Formalities for Chapter 3; Appendix C. Formalities for Chapter 4; Appendix D. Formalities for Chapter 5.
