Description
A companion volume to the
International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs.
Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions.
This cutting-edge work will be an unmatched resource for scholars and students of corruption, professionals in international aid and finance organizations, and scholars and professionals with more general interests in economic and political development.
Contributors: T.S. Aidt, D.M. Aldrighi, E. Auriol, F. Boehm, E. Buscaglia, B. Clausen, S. Cole, A. Estache, B. Flyvbjerg, Y. Jeong, C. Kenny, A. Kraay, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, E. Molloy, P. Murrell, M. Musatova, L.V. Peisakhin, G. Piga, J.D. Potter, F. Recanatini, S. Rose-Ackerman, T. Søreide, S. Straub, M. Tavits, A. Tran, R. Truex, M. Vagliasindi, P.C. Vicente, R.J. Weiner, L. Wren-Lewis
