Description
Book SynopsisThis book examines the question of how to deter a non-state terrorist actor.
Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state's counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor's grand strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan Workers'' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition which is the non-state organization's strategy for victory. To escape the attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become critical educational moments. T
Table of Contents
Introduction, Elli Lieberman 1. Theoretical Models of Deterring Terrorism, Elli Lieberman 2. Israel-Hezbollah: From ‘Rules of the Game’ to Deterrence Stability, Daniel Sobelman 3. Israel-PLO: From National Liberation to Deterrence Stability, Or Honig and Ido Yahel 4. Britain-PIRA: From National Liberation to Diplomacy and Peace, Rory Finegan 5. Russia-Chechnya: From National Liberation to Deterrence Stability, Tracey German 6. Reaching a Balance of Resolve: The Enduring Conflict between Turkey and the PKK, Metin Gurcan and Mustafa Cosar Unal 7. Israel-Hamas: From National Liberation to Partial Deterrence Stability, Joshua Arsenault and Or Honig 8. United States-Taliban, al-Qaeda, and ISIS: The Failure to Defeat Jihadist Terror, Arie Perliger and Matthew Sweeney Conclusion, Elli Lieberman
