Description
This timely book offers a comprehensive examination of the current state of nuclear stability postures worldwide, effectively highlighting their inherent limitations. Through their analysis, the authors illustrate how the seemingly contradictory perspectives of deterrence optimists, disarmament idealists, and warfighting pessimists can be reconfigured into a unified approach towards achieving regional and global peace. They suggest that these strategies can be reconciled as complementary, rather than substitute approaches, to achieve the common goal of nuclear stability.
To achieve this objective, the book employs a game-theoretical framework to analytically define the conditions for nuclear war. Drawing from extensive observations of significant crises, the model incorporates identifiable systemic regularities that influence the strategic decision-making process during severe crises and establish the prerequisites for different levels of nuclear confrontation. Additionally, by tracing the strategic-technological trajectories of nuclear powers, the authors present a novel analysis that explores the potential for stable coexistence to replace unstable confrontation between global powers, ultimately fostering nuclear peace.
The author's theoretical explorations lead to the policy conclusion that establishing a nuclear oligopolistic hierarchy, under the leadership of preponderant global powers committed to a no-first-use pledge, presents the most effective international system for enhancing both regional and global nuclear stability. This book aims to surpass the Cold War origins of current nuclear strategy and develop a comprehensive policy framework that guarantees enduring nuclear stability in the contemporary world.
