Description
Book SynopsisThis timely book offers a comprehensive examination of the current state of nuclear stability postures worldwide, effectively highlighting their inherent limitations. Through their analysis, the authors illustrate how the seemingly contradictory perspectives of deterrence optimists, disarmament idealists, and warfighting pessimists can be reconfigured into a unified approach towards achieving regional and global peace. They suggest that these strategies can be reconciled as complementary, rather than substitute approaches, to achieve the common goal of nuclear stability.
To achieve this objective, the book employs a game-theoretical framework to analytically define the conditions for nuclear war. Drawing from extensive observations of significant crises, the model incorporates identifiable systemic regularities that influence the strategic decision-making process during severe crises and establish the prerequisites for different levels of nuclear confrontation. Additionally, by tracing the strategic-technological trajectories of nuclear powers, the authors present a novel analysis that explores the potential for stable coexistence to replace unstable confrontation between global powers, ultimately fostering nuclear peace.
The author's theoretical explorations lead to the policy conclusion that establishing a nuclear oligopolistic hierarchy, under the leadership of preponderant global powers committed to a no-first-use pledge, presents the most effective international system for enhancing both regional and global nuclear stability. This book aims to surpass the Cold War origins of current nuclear strategy and develop a comprehensive policy framework that guarantees enduring nuclear stability in the contemporary world.
Table of ContentsForeword by Ronald Tammen
1. Introduction
This chapter overviews currently contradictory nuclear arguments by advocates of disarmament, deterrence, and warfighting. Outside of the realm of deterrence looms the possibility that non-state agents will acquire and use dirty bombs. Strategies to deal with this increasingly likely contingency are not in place. As we move to a nuclear world beyond deterrence, we emphasize a need for the new strategic guidance to prevent the critical threats to human existence as we face an increasingly complex array of nuclear challenges.
2. 2. The Size and Scope of Nuclear Arsenals
This chapter provides a chronological snapshot of nuclear proliferation. We show that evolving technology and lack of commitment to established deterrence strategies causes the drastic rise in the size and composition of nuclear arsenals. We e valuate the implications of primary events of nuclear competitions, including the arms race of strategic weapons, the deployment of tactical warheads, the transfer of weapons to regional powers. The decision of voluntary denuclearization is an important step that because of the lack of commitment by global nuclear powers has not secured societies that choose to do so.
3. 3. The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in Theory and Practice
This chapter documents and analytically defines how and why the nuclear deterrence postures have shifted from Bernard Brodie's no-first-use doctrine under Massive Retaliation (MR) to Kenneth Waltz's neorealist principle of balance of terror under Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). We identify theoretical and practical inconsistency shared by both perspectives and evaluate the recent emergence of nuclear warfighting philosophy.
4. 4.The Evolution of Disarmament in theory and Practice
Past works view deterrence and disarmament as alternate but contradictory paths to nuclear stability. We show that they are two sides of the similar attempts to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. Although the Global Zero movement has been endorsed by a vast number of academics and practitioners, this chapter shows that a major obstacle to such a disarmament proposal is the lack of trust among global powers that voids any attempts at enforceability. The practical alternative are regional nuclear-free zones first implemented after the Treaty of Tlatelolco that have now been adopted by the majority of nations south of the Equator. We show how and why NFZ can complement nuclear stability provided that the global nuclear powers guarantee regional stability.
5. 5. The Rise of Nuclear Warfighting Strategies
This chapter investigates the dynamics of nuclear escalation and the development of tactical nuclear strategies. Exploring the evolution of warfighting strategies from their early inception, we first examine salient aspects of early counterforce and countervalue strategies. We then assess the tactical aspects of escalation theory evaluating the likely success if tactical nuclear strikes to prevent escalation.
6. Based on discussions from previous chapters, we develop a novel model that identifies and addresses all domains of nuclear challenges capable of inflicting grave loss of life and economic devastation. Unlike previous perspectives, our specification incorporates (a) the interaction between conventional and nuclear capabilities, (b) the policy motivation based on status quo evaluations and inter-state trust that can alter the perception of the security environment, and (c) the physical exposure to retaliation as the measurable component in the calculus of war. Our model Integrating Deterrence, Disarmament and War Fighting Strategies identifying the necessary but not sufficient conditions for different levels of nuclear war and those required for peace. requirements
7. 6. Long Term Stability Beyond Deterrence
This chapter summarizes the implications of our perspective on nuclear stability. We show that deterrence under Massive Retaliation (MR) is unstable since a dissatisfied challenger with military superiority likely makes nuclear blackmail. Deterrence under Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is tenuous at global or regional levels since only under the balance of terror generated by nuclear parity military disputes can escalate to massive all-out nuclear war. We show that formulating and adopting warfighting strategies may potentially reduce costs of limited nuclear war but is unlikely to avert escalating conflicts at nuclear parity. Lack of experience at this level of carnage and the lack of effective escalation theory identifying the cost threshold when war would stop is still missing (conventional conflict seldom exceeded 25% loss in any nation – such levels can be achieved in the nuclear era in days not years). On the positive side we show that disarmament at the regional level can induce regional stability. We show that particularly to the Middle East a NFZ can enhance stability. To generalize the benefits of NFZ we advocate the creation of a new, veto free Nuclear Security Council composed only of the few global nuclear powers. Once in place this institution would allow any global nuclear power to respond to a first strike in any region and particularly against any member of an NFZ. On a less optimistic note, we show that “global-zero” is not a feasible option today and can be considered only after establishing a trust-based security scheme. The preconditions for such a venture are simply not in place.
Appendix 1: Systematic Analysis of Nuclear Crisis Outcomes
This work summaries using an agent-based perspective the evolution and resolution of all nuclear crisis. We refer to these cases throughout the book. The overall analysis shows that outcomes of crisis where threats of nuclear weapons use were involved did not differ from those where no such threats were used. Based on structural conditions, the the number, intensity, and structure of outcomes do not differ from those in the pre-nuclear period.
8. Appendix 2. Formal Model specification and derivations
This section lays out theoretical justifications for our assumptions and specifications of the game-theoretic model of deterrence and disarmament. For interested readers, full equilibrium outcomes and their derivations are presented.
9. References
10. Subject Index
11. Glossary of Terms
