Description

Book Synopsis

.- Computational and Algorithmic Aspects of Games.
.- On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization inZero-Sum Matrix Games under Noisy Feedback.
.- On the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of Anarchy.
.- Mixed Nash Equilibria in Discrete Tullock Contests.
.- Social Welfare in Battery Charging Games.
.- Improved Hardness Results for the Clearing Problem in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps.
.- Coordination Mechanisms on Unrelated Machines with Arbitrary Priority Lists.
.- Facility Location.
.- Constant-Approximate and Constant-Strategyproof Two-Facility Location.
.- Constrained Truthful Obnoxious Two-Facility Location with Optional Preferences.
.- Hotelling-Downs with Facility Synergy: The Mall Effect.
.- Fair Division and Resource Allocation.
.- Tractable Graph Structures in EFX Orientation.
.- Fairness under Equal-Sized Bundles: Impossibility results and Approximation Guarantees.
.- Online Fair Division for Personalized 2-Value Instances.
.- A new lower bound for multi-color discrepancy with applications to fair division.
.- When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods?.
.- Markets and Matching.
.- Unsolvability and Beyond in Many-To-Many Non-Bipartite Stable Matching.
.- Course Allocation with Credits via Stable Matching.
.- Bayesian Decision Making.
.- Bayesian Optimal Stopping with Maximum Value Knowledge.
.- Persuading Agents in Opinion Formation Games.
.- A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events.
.- Mechanism Design and Algorithmic Contracts.
.- Deterministic Refund Mechanisms.
.- Near-Linear MIR Algorithms for Stochastically-Ordered Priors.
.- Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions.
.- Linear Contracts for Supermodular Functions Based on Graphs.
.- Computational Social Choice.
.- Distortion of Multi-Winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison Rule.
.- Metric Distortion under Group-Fair Objectives.
.- Robustness of voting mechanisms to external information.

Algorithmic Game Theory

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    Order before 4pm today for delivery by Mon 15 Jun 2026.

    A Paperback by Ron Lavi

    15 in stock


      View other formats and editions of Algorithmic Game Theory by Ron Lavi

      Publisher: Springer
      Publication Date: 29/09/2025
      ISBN13: 9783032036384, 978-3032036384
      ISBN10:
      Also in:
      Computing Computer modelling and simulation

      Description

      Book Synopsis

      .- Computational and Algorithmic Aspects of Games.
      .- On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization inZero-Sum Matrix Games under Noisy Feedback.
      .- On the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of Anarchy.
      .- Mixed Nash Equilibria in Discrete Tullock Contests.
      .- Social Welfare in Battery Charging Games.
      .- Improved Hardness Results for the Clearing Problem in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps.
      .- Coordination Mechanisms on Unrelated Machines with Arbitrary Priority Lists.
      .- Facility Location.
      .- Constant-Approximate and Constant-Strategyproof Two-Facility Location.
      .- Constrained Truthful Obnoxious Two-Facility Location with Optional Preferences.
      .- Hotelling-Downs with Facility Synergy: The Mall Effect.
      .- Fair Division and Resource Allocation.
      .- Tractable Graph Structures in EFX Orientation.
      .- Fairness under Equal-Sized Bundles: Impossibility results and Approximation Guarantees.
      .- Online Fair Division for Personalized 2-Value Instances.
      .- A new lower bound for multi-color discrepancy with applications to fair division.
      .- When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods?.
      .- Markets and Matching.
      .- Unsolvability and Beyond in Many-To-Many Non-Bipartite Stable Matching.
      .- Course Allocation with Credits via Stable Matching.
      .- Bayesian Decision Making.
      .- Bayesian Optimal Stopping with Maximum Value Knowledge.
      .- Persuading Agents in Opinion Formation Games.
      .- A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events.
      .- Mechanism Design and Algorithmic Contracts.
      .- Deterministic Refund Mechanisms.
      .- Near-Linear MIR Algorithms for Stochastically-Ordered Priors.
      .- Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions.
      .- Linear Contracts for Supermodular Functions Based on Graphs.
      .- Computational Social Choice.
      .- Distortion of Multi-Winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison Rule.
      .- Metric Distortion under Group-Fair Objectives.
      .- Robustness of voting mechanisms to external information.

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