Description
Book SynopsisThis contributed volume focuses on aspects of dynamic game theory including differential games, evolutionary games, and stochastic games. It covers theoretical developments, algorithmic methods, and applications to fields as varied as mathematical biology, environmental management, economics, engineering, guidance and control, and social interaction. It will be of interest to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and advanced graduate students.
Advances in Dynamic Games presents state-of-the-art research that serves as a testament to the vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. Its contributions, written by experts in their respective disciplines, are outgrowths of presentations originally given at the 15th International Symposium of Dynamic Games and Applications held July 19–22, 2012, in Byšice, Czech Republic.
Table of ContentsPart I Dynamic Games: Theory and Computation.- 1 Relative Value Iteration for Stochastic Differential Games.- 2 OPTGAME3: A Dynamic Game Solver and an Economic Example.- 3 Dynamic Programming Approach to Aircraft Control in a Windshear.- 4 Existence of Optimal Controls for a Bi-Level Optimal Control Problem.- 5 Static Linear-Quadratic Gaussian Games.- 6 Interior Convergence Under Payoff Monotone Selections and Proper Equilibrium: Application to Equilibrium Selection.- Part II Dynamic Games: Applications.- 7 Should a Retailer Support a Quality Improvements Strategy?.- 8 A Large Population Parental Care Game with Asynchronous Moves.- 9 Conditions for Cooperation and Trading in Value-Cost Dynamic Games.- 10 Intra-seasonal Strategies Based on Energy Budgets in a Dynamic Predator-Prey Game.- 11 On a Game-Theoretic Model of Environmental Pollution Problem.- Part III Pursuit-Evasion Games 12 Open-Loop Solvability Operator in Differential Games with Simple Motions in the Plane.- 13 Game with Two Pursuers and One Evader: Case of Weak Pursuers.- 14 Collaborative Interception of Moving Re-Locatable Target .- 15 The Effect of Pursuer Dynamics on the Value of Linear.- Pursuit-Evasion Games with Bounded Controls.
