Description
Book SynopsisBy making powerful historic comparisons and drawing from personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary world.
Table of ContentsIntroduction The Past as Prologue Part I Further Defining War Termination The Decisive Victory Paradigm Undermines Strategy for Irregular War Part II Light Footprints to a Long War Plans Hit Reality The Fall of the Taliban and the Bonn Conference America's Bureaucratic Way of War Conclusion to Part II Part III Accelerating Success, 2003-7 Failing to Keep Pace with the Insurgency, 2007-9 The Good War Going Badly Surging into the Good War More Shovels in the Quicksand Misapplying the Iraq Formula Assessments and Risks Conclusion to Part III Part IV Reconciliation versus Transition Reconciling Reconciliation Competing Visions: Karzai, Taliban, Pakistan Exploratory Talks: Building and Damaging Confidence Coming off the Rails Fall-Out: BSA, Bergdahl, and the 2014 Elections Conclusion to Part IV Part V Operation Iraqi Freedom A Complicated Approach to a Complex Situation From Decisive Victory to Transition Conclusion to Part V Part VI Achieving Milestones while Losing the War Trapped by Partners in a Losing Strategy Mirror imaging civil-military relations To Surge or Not to Surge A New Plan on Shaky Foundations Conclusion to Part VI Part VII Surge Misunderstood The Absence of a Political Strategy Erodes U.S. Leverage New Administration, Similar Challenges Conclusion to Part VII Part VIII Iraq and Afghanistan Compared Implications for U.S. foreign policy Implications for scholarship Appendix Abbreviations Glosssary of Key Actors Key Events in the Afhanistan Conflict Key Events in the Iraq Conflict
