Description
Book SynopsisWittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement (or MRTJ) marked a crucial turning point in the lives of two great twentieth-century thinkers. It was also a watershed moment within the history of analytic philosophy itself. Yet scholarly consensus around a satisfactory interpretation of the nature of the critique, the extent of and reasons for its impact on Russell, along with the role it played within Wittgenstein’s development have remained elusive. With these facts in mind, this book aims to accomplish four interrelated goals. The first is to develop a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s MRTJ. The second is to defend this reading, called the ‘logical interpretation’ (or LI) against its most prominent competitors in the scholarly literature. Third, the book aims to situate Wittgenstein’s critique of the MRTJ and Russell’s reaction to it, within the broader context of each of Wittgenstein’s and Russell’s respective philosophical developments. Fourth and finally, the book aims to introduce students and scholars of early analytic philosophy to, and familiarize them with the historical events, textual evidence, scholarly controversies, letters, notes and diagrams, consideration of which is integral to constructing a plausible reading of Wittgenstein’s objection.
Trade Review“This is the first comprehensive book length treatment of Wittgenstein’s critique of Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment. Connelly covers all of the historical and philosophical issues surrounding Wittgenstein’s critique and offers a new and deeply interesting interpretation. It is a masterful achievement.” —Peter Hanks, Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, USA
“This book is an insightful and illuminating study, combining a rich critical summary of existing interpretations and an interesting new account. It is essential reading for all students and scholars of the Russell–Wittgenstein dispute concerning the nature of judgement” —Graham Stevens, Head of Philosophy Department, School of Social Science, University of Manchester, UK
“James Connelly first conducts an expert tour through elusive primary sources and voluminous secondary literature in order to advance his own distinctive interpretation of the philosophical confrontation that waged between Russell and Wittgenstein in 1913. Secondly, Connelly demonstrates the ongoing and much-overlooked influence that this confrontation had over the evolution of Wittgenstein’s own philosophical development. For both of these reasons, Connelly has made a vital contribution to the history of early analytic philosophy.” —Samuel Lebens, Research Fellow, University of Haifa, Israel
Table of ContentsList of Common Abbreviations; Introduction; Chapter 1: Historical and Philosophical Background; Chapter 2: The Scholarly Controversy; Chapter 3: Russell’s Paralysis; Chapter 4: Wittgenstein on Truth, Logic and Representation.
