Description
Book SynopsisEpistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between oneâs simply having good reasons for some belief and oneâs actually basing oneâs belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in natureâa belief is based on a reason if and only if the belief is properly caused by the reasonâthere is hardly any widely accepted, counterexample-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is therefore of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain both crucially incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons.
Well-Founded Belief brings together 16 essays written by leading epistemologists to explore this important topic in gre
Table of Contents
Introduction
Patrick Bondy and J. Adam Carter
Part I: The Nature of the Basing Relation
1. A Doxastic-Causal Theory of Epistemic Basing
Ru Ye
2. All Evidential Basing is Phenomenal Basing
Andrew Moon
3. Dispositions and the Basing Relation
Hamid Vahid
4. The Many Ways of the Basing Relation
Luca Moretti and Tommaso Piazza
5. Reasons and Basing in Commonsense Epistemology: Evidence from Two Experiments
John Turri
6. Inference and the Basing Relation
Keith Allen Korcz
7. The Superstitious Lawyer’s Inference
Patrick Bondy and J. Adam Carter
8. Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)
Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan
Part II: Basing and Its Applications
9. Hermeneutical Injustice as Basing Failure
Mona Simion
10. Agency and the Basing Relation
Ram Neta
11. Epistemic Conservatism and the Basing Relation
Kevin McCain
12. Can Beliefs be Based on Practical Reasons?
Miriam McCormick
13. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Factive Bases for Belief
Duncan Pritchard
14. From Epistemic Basing to Epistemic Grounding
Jesper Kallestrup
15. Well-Founded Belief and the Contingencies of Epistemic Location
Guy Axtell
16. The Epistemic Basing Relation and Knowledge-That as Knowledge-How
Stephen Hetherington
