Description

Book Synopsis
Shows how creating weaker forms of judicial review may actually allow for stronger social welfare rights under American constitutional law. This book describes how weak-form review works in Great Britain and Canada and discusses the extent to which legislatures can be expected to enforce constitutional norms on their own.

Trade Review
"In this study of various theoretical issues of concern to students of comparative constitutional law, Tushnet has done a remarkable job of analyszing and comparing existing forms of judicial review...Tushnet's impeccable research leads us through varied constitutional systems including, for example, Argentina, Canada, Great Britain, and Ireland. This is constitutional scholarship at its best."--R.J. Steamer, Choice "Tushnet explores two prominent questions that constitutional drafters must ask: What powers of judicial review should courts have? and What rights should be enumerated? ... Tushnet's ambitious agenda in Weak Courts, Strong Rights is equally important for political scientists and comparative legal scholars."--Theresa J. Squatrito, Comparative Political Studies "Mark Tushnet has written an important book, featuring mastery of pertinent comparative constitutional law literature and an incredible ideas-per-ink ratio... Any serious scholar of comparative constitutional law cannot afford to skip this book."--Ran Hirschl, Ottawa Law Review

Table of Contents
Preface ix Acknowledgments xv Part I: Strong-Form and Weak-Form Judicial Review Chapter 1: Why Comparative Constitutional Law? 3 Chapter 2: Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 18 Chapter 3: The Possible Instability of Weak-Form Review and Its Implications 43 Part II: Legislative Responsibility for Enforcing the Constitution Chapter 4: Why and How to Evaluate Constitutional Performance 79 Chapter 5: Constitutional Decision Making Outside the Courts 111 Part III: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights Chapter 6: The State Action Doctrine and Social and Economic Rights 161 Chapter 7: Structures of Judicial Review, Horizontal Effect, and Social Welfare Rights 196 Chapter 8: Enforcing Social and Economic Rights 227 Table of Cases 265 Index 269

Weak Courts Strong Rights

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    A Paperback / softback by Mark Tushnet

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      Publisher: Princeton University Press
      Publication Date: 09/08/2009
      ISBN13: 9780691143200, 978-0691143200
      ISBN10: 069114320X

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      Shows how creating weaker forms of judicial review may actually allow for stronger social welfare rights under American constitutional law. This book describes how weak-form review works in Great Britain and Canada and discusses the extent to which legislatures can be expected to enforce constitutional norms on their own.

      Trade Review
      "In this study of various theoretical issues of concern to students of comparative constitutional law, Tushnet has done a remarkable job of analyszing and comparing existing forms of judicial review...Tushnet's impeccable research leads us through varied constitutional systems including, for example, Argentina, Canada, Great Britain, and Ireland. This is constitutional scholarship at its best."--R.J. Steamer, Choice "Tushnet explores two prominent questions that constitutional drafters must ask: What powers of judicial review should courts have? and What rights should be enumerated? ... Tushnet's ambitious agenda in Weak Courts, Strong Rights is equally important for political scientists and comparative legal scholars."--Theresa J. Squatrito, Comparative Political Studies "Mark Tushnet has written an important book, featuring mastery of pertinent comparative constitutional law literature and an incredible ideas-per-ink ratio... Any serious scholar of comparative constitutional law cannot afford to skip this book."--Ran Hirschl, Ottawa Law Review

      Table of Contents
      Preface ix Acknowledgments xv Part I: Strong-Form and Weak-Form Judicial Review Chapter 1: Why Comparative Constitutional Law? 3 Chapter 2: Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 18 Chapter 3: The Possible Instability of Weak-Form Review and Its Implications 43 Part II: Legislative Responsibility for Enforcing the Constitution Chapter 4: Why and How to Evaluate Constitutional Performance 79 Chapter 5: Constitutional Decision Making Outside the Courts 111 Part III: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights Chapter 6: The State Action Doctrine and Social and Economic Rights 161 Chapter 7: Structures of Judicial Review, Horizontal Effect, and Social Welfare Rights 196 Chapter 8: Enforcing Social and Economic Rights 227 Table of Cases 265 Index 269

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