Description
Book SynopsisThis book is a study of Adolf Hitler in his role as military commander and strategist from the beginning of the Second World War until the end of 1942, examining in detail the campaign in southern Russia that year.
The thesis challenges the post-war narrative of Hitler as a dilettante who was solely responsible for the strategic and operational errors that led to Germany's defeat in the war. Instead, this research highlights that decisions made by Hitler with respect to such disparate themes as strategy, operations, logistics, intelligence, economics, air and naval power, and coalition warfare were generally sound if viewed from his perspective, even if they were not ultimately successful. It also gives an overview of his own ideas concerning all aspects of military affairs, such as intelligence, command and morale. The careful analysis of Hitler's decision-making process offers a unique contribution to Second World War scholarship and moves beyond a superficial understanding
Table of Contents
Introduction 1. Hitler and War 2. The German Army and High Command to 1939 3. Hitler’s Strategy from the Polish Campaign to the First Russian Winter, 1941-42 4. The Wehrmacht and its Allies 5. Transport and Logistics 6. Military Intelligence and FHO 7. The Campaign Conclusion
