Description
Book SynopsisAn analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. It discusses questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958. It provides a link between domestic politics and foreign policy.
Trade Review"[Christensen] makes a convincing and original argument that political leaders, in order to secure public support for their fundamental grand strategy, may have to adopt a more hostile foreign policy than they would prefer ... This volume is indispensable for anyone interested in Sino-American relations."--Foreign Affairs
Table of ContentsList of Figures and TablesPrefaceNote on Translation and RomanizationCh. 1Introduction3Ch. 2Grand Strategy, National Political Power, and Two-Level Foreign Policy Analysis11Ch. 3Moderate Strategies and Crusading Rhetoric: Truman Mobilizes for a Bipolar World32Ch. 4Absent at the Creation: Acheson's Decision to Forgo Relations with the Chinese Communists77Ch. 5The Real Lost Chance in China: Nonrecognition, Taiwan, and the Disaster at the Yalu138Ch. 6Continuing Conflict over Taiwan: Mao, the Great Leap Forward, and the 1958 Quemoy Crisis194Ch. 7Conclusion242App. AAmerican Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1950263App. BMao's Korean War Telegrams271Bibliography277Index305
