Description
Book SynopsisThe United States' commitment to non-proliferation often propels its foreign policy rhetoric. In 2002, George W. Bush framed his goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons within the context of the global war on terror, accusing Iran of being part of the Axis of Evil. Iran's nuclear program was declared an intolerable threat to global peace and stability. This approach however showed the conflict between the rhetoric of good vs. evil and the need for a pragmatic and measured approach to non-proliferation in the Middle East. The book explores this divergence between the alarmist rhetoric of the Bush Administration's public diplomacy and its actual non-proliferation policy toward Iran. It shows how the two policy directions, the war on terror and negotiations over the nuclear issue, were often at odds. Further, the Administration's desire to change the regime in Iran undermined efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. Ultimately, the policies implemented failed b
Trade ReviewKumuda Simpson has produced a carefully researched book on a topic that is so often misunderstood. By placing Iran’s nuclear deal in the broad context of turbulent relations between the United States and Iran, as well as the regional dynamics, Simpson offers a penetrating and comprehensive analysis. This is a must-read for anyone trying to make sense of Iran’s future in the Persian Gulf. -- Shahram Akbarzadeh, Professor of Middle East and Central Asian Politics, Deakin University
Kumuda Simpson’s clear-eyed and balanced account of U.S. nuclear policy toward Iran under Bush and Obama shows that history matters. But Simpson’s real contribution to the debate is to show that what matters more are the enduring and mutually disabling effects of the stories the players tell about themselves and the demonized other side. Simpson’s U.S.-Iran lucid case study also provides a a more generally salient guide to pathways out of a security dilemma. -- Richard Tanter, senior research associate, Nautilus Institute; professor in the School of Political and Social Studies, University of Melbourne, Australia
Table of ContentsIntroduction Chapter 1: America and Iran during the Cold War Chapter 2: The War on Terror and Iran’s Nuclear Program Chapter 3: Policy Confusion and Regional Instability Chapter 4: President Obama and the Enrichment Issue Chapter 5: Diplomacy and the Geneva Process Chapter 6: The Future of Middle Eastern Proliferation Conclusion Bibliography
