Description
Book SynopsisRobert Almeder provides a comprehensive discussion and definitive refutation of our common conception of truth as a necessary condition for knowledge of the world, and to defend in detail an epistemic conception of truth without falling into the usual epistemological relativism or classical idealism in which all properties of the world turn out to be linguistic in nature and origin. There is no other book available that clearly and thoroughly defends the case for an epistemic conception of truth and also claims success in avoiding idealism or epistemological relativism.
Trade ReviewFew philosophers have thought as long and as hard about the issues of the truth and our knowledge of it as Robert Almeder. And as so often in philosophy, they way to insight proceeds most smoothly along the path of criticism. By critiquing virtually all of the influential present-day opponents of his views, Almder manages to provide a firm footing for his own persuasive and eminently instructive position. -- University of Pittsburgh, Micholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh
Those who take the epistemic account of truth to be a non-starter should read this compact book carefully. Almeder goes on the offense here, and develops a pragmatist epistemology farther than anyone has before. A must-read. -- Linda Alcoff, CUNY Grad Center
The most sustained defense of an epistemic theory of truth available, coupled with a detailed response to various species of skepticism. Highly recommended as a gateway to contemporary debates on the nature of truth. -- Paul Humphreys, University of Virginia
Table of ContentsPreface Part 1: Rejecting Correspondence and All Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Minimal Requirements for an Adequate Theory of Truth Chapter 3: Justification for Non-Vacuity and Reliability Principles Chapter 4: The Core of Correspondence and Other Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth Chapter 5: The Main Argument Against Correspondence and Other Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth Chapter 6: How the Main Argument Differs From Other Similar Arguments Chapter 7: Forestalling Three Predictable Objections to the Main Argument Chapter 8: Does the Main Argument Confuse Chapter 9: Does the Main Argument Require Abandoning Truth as a Goal? Chapter 10: An Objection from Common Sense Chapter 11: The Objection from the Paradox of Analysis Chapter 12: A Proposed Reduction of the Main Argument Part 2: In Defense of the Epistemic Theory of Truth Chapter 1: Preliminary Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Truth Chapter 2: Other Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Truth Chapter 3: Conclusion Part 3: Defeating Skepticism Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: The Moral of the Above Taxonomy Chapter 3: Self-Defeating Skepticisms and the Strength of Global Weak Skepticism Chapter 4: The Canonical Argument for Global Weak Skepticism and the Contextualist Response Chapter 5: Other Critiques of Contextualism Chapter 6: The Asymmetry Objection to the Argument from Ignorance Chapter 7: Global Weak Skepticism as an Inference to the Best Explanation Chapter 8: Is the Global Skepticism here Refuted Implied by the Main Argument? Part 4:Conclusions Chapter 1: The Main Problem and Future Prospects Chapter 2: Blind realism and the Non-Vacuity Objection Chapter 3: Does Blind Realism Presuppose Non-Epistemic Truth? Chapter 4: The Fitch Objection Bibliography Index
