Description
Book SynopsisThis important new book deals with some of the most fundamental issues of transaction cost economics. It focuses on the analysis of the internal nature and characteristics of organizations and on the subtle interactions between institutional environment and governance structures over time.
Transaction Cost Economics investigates the nature of contractual arrangements involved in large organizations, the 'configurations' of corporations, the modes of governance implemented, and the respective role of different constituencies. The second series of problems addressed in the book concerns the interaction between the institutional environment and governance structures over time, with special emphasis on the Russian privatization programme and the narcotics market. These twin analyses substantiate the distinction between private and public ordering. The book is strongly oriented towards increasing the operationalization of the concepts of transaction cost economics.
The book will be essential reading for everyone interested in the new institutional economics and by recent developments in the theory of contracts, in transaction costs economics and in organisation theory. Because of its emphasis on potential applications, it will also be of interest to readers from management science and those involved in the analysis of economies in transition.
Trade Review'This collection of essays provides interesting and . . . contentious readings.'Table of ContentsContents: Preface 1. Hierarchies, Markets and Power in the Economy: An Economic Perspective (O.E. Williamson) 2. Internal Characteristics of Formal Organizations (C. Menard) 3. Contractual Relationships Within the Firm (J.-P. Bouttes, P. Hamamdjian) 4. Privatization in Russia: What Should be a Firm? (P.L. Joskow, R. Schmalensee) 5. Illegal Markets and New Institutional Economics (M. Turvani) 6. Transaction Costs Through Time (D.C. North) Index
