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Book Synopsis
Over the years, the US has intervened covertly in many countries to remove dictators, subvert elected leaders, and support coups. Explanations for this focus on characteristics of target countries or strategic incentives to pursue regime change. This Element provides an account of domestic political factors constraining US presidents'' authorization of covert foreign-imposed regime change operations (FIRCs), arguing that congressional attention to covert action alters the Executive''s calculus by increasing the political costs associated with this secretive policy instrument. It shows that congressional attention is the result of institutional battles over abuses of executive authority and has a significant constraining effect independent of codified rules and partisan disputes. These propositions are tested using content analysis of the Congressional Record, statistical analysis of Cold War covert FIRCs, and causal-process evidence relating to covert interventions in Chile, Angola, Central America, Afghanistan, etc.

Tiptoeing through the Tulips with Congress

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    A Paperback by Dani Kaufmann Nedal

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      View other formats and editions of Tiptoeing through the Tulips with Congress by Dani Kaufmann Nedal

      Publisher: Cambridge University Press
      Publication Date: 1/31/2025
      ISBN13: 9781009597999, 978-1009597999
      ISBN10: 100959799X

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      Over the years, the US has intervened covertly in many countries to remove dictators, subvert elected leaders, and support coups. Explanations for this focus on characteristics of target countries or strategic incentives to pursue regime change. This Element provides an account of domestic political factors constraining US presidents'' authorization of covert foreign-imposed regime change operations (FIRCs), arguing that congressional attention to covert action alters the Executive''s calculus by increasing the political costs associated with this secretive policy instrument. It shows that congressional attention is the result of institutional battles over abuses of executive authority and has a significant constraining effect independent of codified rules and partisan disputes. These propositions are tested using content analysis of the Congressional Record, statistical analysis of Cold War covert FIRCs, and causal-process evidence relating to covert interventions in Chile, Angola, Central America, Afghanistan, etc.

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