Description
Book SynopsisGibbard considers how our actions, and our realities, emerge from the questions and decisions we form for ourselves. He investigates the very nature of the questions we ask ourselves when we ask how we should live, and clarifies the concept of “ought” by understanding the patterns of normative concepts involved in beliefs and decisions.
Trade ReviewEverywhere in Gibbard’s impressive book opponents as well as allies have much to learn… His book is a pleasure to read, crafted with admirable care and clarity while minimizing technicality. The arguments are concise, and much has been packed into a relatively short compass, but there is a wealth of rich and suggestive detail. It is a book that deserves close study, and will stimulate and reward reflection. -- Garrett Cullity * Philosophical Quarterly *
In this fascinating book, Gibbard applies his development of the tools of traditional Anglo-American metaethical theory to the questions about that most basic philosophical concern: How should one live?… Gibbard’s arguments are clear and illustrated with helpful examples. His final result is sure to generate disagreement, but theorists in this area must contend with his arguments. -- J. H. Barker * Choice *
Gibbard writes elegantly, and the theory he develops is innovative, philosophically sophisticated, and challenging. Gibbard defends his theory vigorously and with admirable intellectual honesty. -- David Copp, Professor of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University
This is a remarkable book. It takes up a central and much-discussed problem—the difference between normative thought (and discourse) and ‘descriptive’ thought (and discourse). It develops a compelling response to that problem with ramifications for much else in philosophy. But perhaps most importantly, it brings new clarity and rigor to the discussion of these tangled issues. It will take some time to come to terms with the details of Gibbard’s discussion. It is absolutely clear, however, that the book will reconfigure the debate over objectivity and ‘factuality’ in ethics. -- Gideon Rosen, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
Table of ContentsI. Preliminaries 1. Introduction: A Possibility Proof 2. Intuitionism as Template: Emending Moore II. The Thing to Do 3. Planning and Ruling Out: The "Frege-Geach" Problem 4. Judgment, Disagreement, Negation 5. Supervenience and Constitution 6. Character and Import III. Normative Concepts 7. Ordinary Oughts: Meaning and Motivation 8. Normative Kinds: Patterns of Engagement 9. What to Say about the Thing to Do: The Expressivistic Turn and What it Gains Us IV. Knowing What to Do 10. Explaining with Plans 11. Knowing What to Do 12. Ideal Response Concepts 13. Deep Vindication and Practical Confidence 14. Impasse and Dissent References Index
