Description
Book SynopsisPresents evidence that under certain widespread structural conditions, democratic accountability falls prey to the same N-person prisoner's dilemma that plagues any other decentralized attempt to procure collective goods. Examines four prominent democracies: postwar and contemporary Brazil and pre-Chavez and contemporary Venezuela.
Trade Review“Lyne’s book constructs a sophisticated micro-logic of citizens’ and politicians’ choices resulting in exchanges based on clientelistic side-payments or policies as ways to perform democratic accountability. Institutions play a contingent role in that process, but Lyne shows how the role of institutions is nested in a political-economic framework. Lyne’s book develops an impressive array of indirect empirical tests of her theory with data from Brazil and Venezuela. Anyone interested in democratic accountability should read this book.”
—Herbert P. Kitschelt,Duke University
“In this theoretically groundbreaking work, Lyne expertly identifies gaps in the existing literature on democratic accountability, particularly the inability to explain variations in development policy. This creative look at electoral strategies illuminates new venues for future research.”
—M. F. T. Malone Choice
“The Voter’s Dilemma and Democratic Accountability: Latin America and Beyond presents an elegant and sophisticated logic of democratic accountability and makes a significant contribution to the literatures on democratic accountability, clientelism, and Latin American studies.”
—Gustavo A. Flores-Macías Political Science Quarterly
Table of ContentsContents
List of Tables and Figures
Acknowledgments
List of Acronyms
Introduction: Theories of Democratic Accountability and Development in Brazil and Venezuela
1. The Voter’s Dilemma: Collective or Clientelistic Goods?
2. Are Voters in Brazil and Venezuela Opting for Policy-Based or Quid Pro Quo Voting?
3. Party Behavior: Policy-Based or Quid Pro Quo Appeals to Voters?
4. Internal Party Organization: Align Individual and Collective Goals to Build a Policy Reputation or to Ensure Efficient Vote Buying?
5. Legislative Organization: Governing Majority Agenda Control or Mutual Veto?
6. Policy Choice: Generate Sustained Growth or Maximize Quid Pro Quo?
Conclusion
Appendixes
References
Index
