Description
Book SynopsisOne fundamental premise of democratic theory is that social policy, group choice, or collective action should be based on the preferences of the individuals in the society, group, or collective. Using the tools of formal mathematical analysis, Peter C. Fishburn explores and defines the conditions for social choice and methods for synthesizing indiv
Table of Contents*Frontmatter, pg. i*PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, pg. vii*CONTENTS, pg. ix*CHAPTER 1 Introduction, pg. 1*CHAPTER 2. Social Choice Functions for Two Alternatives, pg. 15*CHAPTER 3. Duality and Representative Systems, pg. 26*CHAPTER 4. Decisive Coalitions and Representative Systems, pg. 39*CHAPTER 5. Weighted Voting and Anonymous Choice Functions, pg. 50*CHAPTER 6. Strong Decisiveness and Special Majorities, pg. 61*CHAPTER 7. Binary Relations and Binary Choices, pg. 71*CHAPTER 8. Simple Majority Social Choice, pg. 86*CHAPTER 9. Single-Peaked Preferences, pg. 100*CHAPTER 10. Guarantees and Triples, pg. 111*CHAPTER 11. Transitive Majorities, pg. 131*CHAPTER 12. Condorcet Conditions, pg. 145*CHAPTER 13. From Borda to Dodgson, pg. 159*CHAPTER 14. Conditions for Social Choice, pg. 177*CHAPTER 15. Choice Functions and Passive Intraprofile Conditions, pg. 190*CHAPTER 16. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, pg. 203*CHAPTER 17. Summation Social Choice Functions, pg. 217*CHAPTER 18. Lotteries on Social Alternatives, pg. 234*REFERENCES, pg. 255*INDEX, pg. 261
