Description
Book SynopsisWirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968.
Trade ReviewA fascinating book. Combining the disciplines of history and political science with insights from psychological theory, Wirtz has produced both a pathbreaking analysis and a cautionary tale.
-- Heath Twichell * Naval War College Review *
This excellently researched and written volume is a positive addition to our understanding of the event that marked the turning point in U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.
-- John R. Finch * Military Review *
Wirtz analyzes both the North Vietnamese plans and the American effort to counter them in exquisite detail.... His book is a valuable addition to our knowledge of the Vietnam conflict and the pitfalls facing an intelligence effort to divine an enemy's plans.
-- Roger Hilsman * Political Science Quarterly *
Wirtz provides a persuasive explanation for how the Vietnamese achieved surprise at Tet, even though the Americans had intelligence warning them of the attack. His book should be required reading for those interested in this key aspect of the Vietnam War and in the study of intelligence failures.
-- Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. * Journal of American History *
Table of ContentsIntroductionPART I: "THE BIG VICTORY, THE GREAT TASK"
1. The Communist Debate over Strategy
2. Preparations, and Objectives of the Tet OffensivePART II: THE ORIGINS OF SURPRISE
3. The Sources of American Biases
4. Missing the Signals: July–November 1967
5. Missing the Signals: December 1967–30 January 1968
6. Reacting to the Tet OffensiveConclusion: Explaining the Failure of IntelligenceBibliography
Index
