Description
Book SynopsisForty years of confrontation in Europe have produced a complex set of conditioned reflexes in western military thinking. With the ending of the Warsaw pact, planning and analysis specialists have had to look again at the basic principles of war: there is no sure ground any more. The analysis of threat and response has been transformed and new patterns of likely action, such as the Gulf intervention, have been accommodated. In practical terms, this affects what is taught to both new officers and senior officers about to assume command responsibilities. The essays in the Science of War attempt to develop a broader understanding of the factors that operate at the higher levels of war, and to study the operational level of war from a general, speculative and penetrating viewpoint. Many contributors also attempt to integrate military theory and historical experience. The aim throughout is to lay down a theoretical grounding in the principles of the planning and conduct of war at the oper
Table of ContentsList of illustrations, Notes on contributors, Preface, Introduction, 1 THE LESSONS OF THE 1920s AND MODERN EXPERIENCE, 2 THE CONTRIBUTION OF ORIGINALITY TO MILITARY SUCCESS, 3 ECONOMY OF EFFORT: A PASSIVE PRINCIPLE, 4 LIDDELL HART AND THE INDIRECT APPROACH TO STRATEGY, 5 BURMA, 1943–5: WHAT LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE?, 6 INCREASING TEMPO ON THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD, 7 DEPTH FIREPOWER: THE VIOLENT, ENABLING ELEMENT, 8 THE FUTURE OF SURPRISE ON THE TRANSPARENT BATTLEFIELD, 9 THE IMPACT OF THE MEDIA ON THE PROSECUTION OF CONTEMPORARY WARFARE, 10 A STUDY OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE NEEDS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, Index
