Description
Book SynopsisIn the summer of 2013 the Central Intelligence Agency and the Clinton Presidential Library made an unprecedented declassification of more than 300 documents showing the role of intelligence in supporting American decision-making on Bosnia in the 1990s, and in particular the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought an end to the fighting in Bosnia. The following spring, James Madison University hosted a conference in which scholars from all over the world assessed what the documents show about what is needed for the complex process of making peace. Aspects covered included military, political, diplomatic, and religious, among others. Timothy R. Walton''s The Role of Intelligence in Ending the War in Bosnia in 1995 offers a collection of papers presented at the conference; several of the authors were participants in the events of the time.
Trade ReviewThe major role that intelligence played in the war in Bosnia has been hidden until now. Drawing on a trove of declassified documents, these excellent essays deepen and change our understanding of US policy-making in this conflict and of the general utility and limits of modern intelligence. -- Robert Jervis, Columbia University, author of Why Intelligence Fails
Table of ContentsForeword: Navigating from War to Peace: Enduring Challenges for Presidents and Citizens, Jonathan R. Alger Chapter 1: The Historical and Bureaucratic Context of the Declassified Documents, Timothy R. Walton Chapter 2: Beyond Bosnia: Ethnical Reasoning in Political Deliberations about Humanitarian Intervention, Pia Antolic-Piper, William Hawk, David McGraw, and Mark Piper Chapter 3: New Lessons from the War in Bosnia - An Analysis Using Computational Methods, Anamaria Berea Chapter 4: Conflict Frames and the Timing of U.S. Intervention in Bosnia, John Hulsey and John A. Scherpereel Chapter 5: Analytic Intelligence and Bosnia Policymaking in the Clinton Administration, Steven L. Burg Chapter 6: Explaining U.S. Foreign Policy toward Bosnia, 1993–95: National Identity, Credibility, and the ‘Stalemate Machine’, Bernd Kaussler, Jonathan Keller, and Yi Edward Yang Chapter 7: Towards a New Social Memory of the Bosnian Genocide: Countering Al-Qaeda’s Radicalization Myth with the CIA “Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency” Archive, Frances Flannery Chapter 8: The Impact of Intelligence on DOD Perceptions of the Bosnian Conflict, 1995, Jonathan Smith Chapter 9: Fallen Off the Priority List: Was Srebrenica an Intelligence Failure?, Bob De Graaff and Cees Wiebes Chapter 10: The Compromises Necessary to Get the Final Deal, Timothy R. Walton Appendix: Principles Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993
