Description
Book SynopsisPhilip Pettit offers a new insight into moral psychology. He shows that attachments such as love, and certain virtues such as honesty, require not only their characteristic positive behaviours in the actual world (i.e. as things are), but preservation of those characteristic behaviours across a range of counterfactual scenarios in which things are different from how they actually are. The counterfactual ''robustness'', in this sense, of these behaviours is thus part of our very conception of these attachments and these virtues. Pettit shows that attachment, virtues, and respect all conform to a similar conceptual geography. He explores the implications of this idea for key moral issues, such as the doctrine of double effect and the distinction between doing and allowing. He articulates and argues against an assumption, which he calls ''moral behaviourism,'' which permeates contemporary ethics.
Trade ReviewBristling with characteristic style, Pettit's book develps a novel and nuanced account of robustly demanding goods. * Robbie Arrell, Australasian Journal of Philosophy *
Table of ContentsPreview 1: The Robust Demands of Attachment 2: The Robust Demands of Virtue 3: The Robust Demands of Respect 4: The Rationale of Robust Demands 5: Doing Good and Being Good 6: Doing Good and Doing Evil 7: Doing Good and Doing Right Overview Appendix I. Reconstructing attachment, virtue and respect Appendix II. Robustness and Probability Appendix III. Robust robustness References Index
