Description
Book SynopsisThe elections of nonpermanent members to the Security Council have become an increasingly competitive political and diplomatic game. Why do states assign to the lengthy, expensive, and difficult commitment that a Security Council candidature entails? What do they want to achieve and why are some states more successful in their endevour? This book establishes that the electoral results over time contribute to a stratified order between states and associate a term in the Council with multiple power enhancing benefits. It explores, especially, the significance of the campaigns carried out by competing candidates for the outcome of the UNSC elections. Contributors are: Anna María Eggertsdóttir, Jóna Sólveig Elínardóttir, Fredrik Dybfest Hjorthen, Touko Piiparinen, Tarja Seppä, Anni Tervo and Baldur Thorhallsson
Table of ContentsAcknowledgments List of Figures and Tables Notes on Contributors 1 The Candidates for a Nonpermanent Seat in the Security Council: Who, Why and How? Ann-Marie Ekengren and Ulrika Möller 2 Competing for an Elected Seat on the Security Council: Who, Why and How? Ann-Marie Ekengren and Ulrika Möller 3 Candidatures and Terms: Detecting Winner and Losers Ulrika Möller and Ann-Marie Ekengren 4 Why do States want a Seat on the unsc? Expectations between Different Types of States Ann-Marie Ekengren, Fredrik D. Hjorthen and Ulrika Möller 5 Candidature Decisions: Six In-depth Examinations Ann-Marie Ekengren, Ulrika Möller, Touko Piiparinen, Tarja Seppä, Anni Tervo, Baldur Thorhallsson, Jóna Sólveig Elínardóttir and Anna M. Eggertsdóttir 6 Competing Small Powers: Austria versus Iceland on the unsc Baldur Thorhallsson, Jóna Sólveig Elínardóttir and Anna M. Eggertsdóttir 7 Greater than Its Size? Comparing Finland’s and Luxembourg’s Campaigns to the Security Council Touko Piiparinen, Tarja Seppä and Anni Tervo 8 Election 2016: Sweden and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Ann-Marie Ekengren and Ulrika Möller 9 Results, Conclusions, and Reflections Ann-Marie Ekengren and Ulrika Möller Index