Description
Book SynopsisThis study analyzes policy-making in a non-democratic authoritarian country, explaining the history of Chinese market reforms from 1979 to the present. Drawing on interviews with high-level Chinese officials, it pieces together detailed histories of economic reform policy decisions.
Table of ContentsAcknowledgments
Formal Authority Relations Among Central Communist
Party and Government Institutions in the People's
Republic of China
PART 1. INTRODUCTION
1. The Political Logic of Economic Reform
2. The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decision
to Initiate Market Reforms
PART 2. CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
3. Authority Relations: The Communist Party and the
Government
4. Leadership Incentives:- Political Succession and
Reciprocal Accountability
5. Bargaining Arena: The Government Bureaucracy
6. Who Is Enfranchised in the Policy-making Process?
7. Decision Rules: Delegation by Consensus
8. Chinese Political Institutions and the Path of
Economic Reforms
PART 3· ECONOMIC REFORM POLICY-MAKING
9. Playing to the Provinces: Fiscal Decentralization
and the Politics of Reform
10. Creating Vested Interests in Reform: Industrial
Reform Takeoff, 1978-81
11. Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict: The
Choice Between Profit Contracting and Substituting
Tax-for-Profit, 1982-83 221
12. Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulating
the Tax-for-Profit Policy, 1983-84
13. The Power of Particularism: Abortive Price Reform
and the Revival of Profit Contracting, 1985-88
PART 4· CONCLUSION
14. The Political Lessons of Economic Reform
in China
Bibliography
Index
