Description
This book offers a generic explanation of the political economy of the EU, demonstrating in a clear and comprehensive way how the present institutional set-up makes it vulnerable to lobbyism, corruption and the destruction of social capital. Gert Tinggaard Svendsen contends that this 'EU disease' may be avoided by strengthening the power of the EU Parliament at the expense of the EU Commission. The book also discusses issues surrounding policy design, international negotiations on climate change and renewable energy sources.
Using an interdisciplinary framework, the author examines how the current institutional set-up of the EU will determine future economic performance and will adversely affect policy outcomes. He looks at whether fundamental EU policies, such as the CAP, are consistent with economic growth or whether these policies will instead distort markets, leading to economic decline. Focusing in detail on international climate negotiations and wind energy, the author explores the way in which the design of a policy proposal can be affected by the interactions between interest groups and the institutions and bureaucrats of the EU. The case of greenhouse gas emissions trading is a unique example because it allows the author to actually measure lobbyism as the difference between the proposed design and the final EU directive.
The interdisciplinary approach of the book and the original treatment of a very pertinent subject will appeal to academics, economists, political scientists and decision-makers. It will also interest and inform a wide readership in the social sciences, particularly those with an interest in the institutional structure of the EU.
