Description
Book SynopsisDoes metacognition, i.e. the capacity to form epistemic self-evaluations about one''s current cognitive performance, derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely, at least in part, on sui generis informational processes? In The Philosophy of Metacognition Joëlle Proust provides a powerful defense of the second position. Drawing on discussions of empirical evidence from comparative, developmental, and experimental psychology, as well as from neuroscience, and on conceptual analyses, she purports to show that, in contrast with analytic metacognition, procedural metacognition does not need to involve metarepresentations. Procedural metacognition seems to be available to some non-humans (some primates and rodents). Proust further claims that metacognition is essentially related to mental agency, i.e. cognitive control and monitoring. ''Self-probing'' is equivalent to a self-addressed question about the feasibility of a mental action (''Am I able to remember this word?''). ''Post-eva
Trade ReviewAn ambitious and groundbreaking book written by Joëlle Proust, an expert from the French CNRS -the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris. * Fernando Salvetti, Philosophical Practice *
This interesting book constitutes a remarkable contribution to our understanding of a rather neglected subject in philosophy of mind ... Philosophers will find it thought provoking, while psychologists may find some conceptual constructions that will be of use in helping them to better understand and explain their observations. * Santiago Arango-Muñoz, Mind & Machines *
Table of Contents1. Introduction ; 2. An evaluativist proposal: cognitive control and metacognition ; 3. Metacognition as cognition about cognition: attributive views ; 4. Metacognition or metarepresentation? A critical discussion of attributivism ; 5. Primate metacognition ; 6. A representational format for procedural metacognition ; 7. Mental acts as natural kinds ; 8. The norms of acceptance ; 9. Epistemic agency and metacognition: an externalist view ; 10. Is there a sense of agency for thought? ; 11. The sense of self as the same ; 12. Experience of agency in schizophrenia ; 13. Conversational metacognition ; 14. Dual-system metacognition and new challenges ; Glossay ; References
