Description
Book SynopsisThe nature of emotion is an important question in several philosophical domains, but little attention has so far been paid to identifying the general ontological category to which emotions belong. Given that they are short-lived, are they events? Since they often have components or stages, are they processes? Or does their close link with behaviour mean they are dispositions? In this volume, leading scholars investigate these basic ontological issues, contributing to current discussions about emotions and paving the way for new research into an underexplored area of philosophy. With chapters addressing issues including the temporal profile of emotions, the distinction between emotions and other affective states, and the epistemology of emotion, this highly original book will be valuable for students and specialists of philosophy, and particularly for those working in the metaphysics of mind and emotions.
Trade Review'In this volume's ten essays, analytic philosophers (Naar among them) explore metaphysical questions about what ontological category to assign emotions … Suitable for specialists, the collection reveals that advances (though perhaps incremental) have been made on many of these problems.' Choice
Table of ContentsIntroduction Hichem Naar and Fabrice Teroni; 1. Mind-body theories and the emotions William Jaworski; 2. Dispositionality and mentality John Heil; 3. Emotion as process Jenefer Robinson; 4. The ontology of emotion Matthew Soteriou; 5. Phenomenal commitments: a puzzle for experiential theories of emotion Jona Vance; 6. An enactivist theory of emotional Content Daniel Shargel and Jesse Prinz; 7. The perceptibility of emotion Joel Smith; 8. Sentiments Hichem Naar; 9. The metaphysics of moods Christine Tappolet; 10. Night fight Clare Mac Cumhaill.
