Description

Book Synopsis
A text seeking to refute one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government.

Table of Contents
Acknowledgments 1: Introduction: The Market Metaphor 2: The Informed Voter 3: Electoral-Market Competition and the Control of Opportunistic Behavior 4: Transaction Costs and the Design of Government institutions 5: Homo Economicus versus Homo Psychologicus: Why Cognitive Psychology Does Not Explain Democratic Politics 6: Legislative Markets and Organization 7: Pressure Groups 8: Bureaucratic Markets: Why Government Bureaucracies Are Efficient and Not Too Large 9: The Market for Regulation 10: The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract and the Role of Transaction Costs in Constitutional Design 11: Majority Rule and Preference Aggregation 12: The Distribution of Economic Wealth and Political Power 13: The Testing of Theory 14: Epilogue: The Burden of Proof References Author Index Subject index

The Myth of Democratic Failure

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    A Paperback / softback by Donald A. Wittman

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      Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
      Publication Date: 01/01/1997
      ISBN13: 9780226904238, 978-0226904238
      ISBN10: 0226904237
      Also in:
      Democracy

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      A text seeking to refute one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government.

      Table of Contents
      Acknowledgments 1: Introduction: The Market Metaphor 2: The Informed Voter 3: Electoral-Market Competition and the Control of Opportunistic Behavior 4: Transaction Costs and the Design of Government institutions 5: Homo Economicus versus Homo Psychologicus: Why Cognitive Psychology Does Not Explain Democratic Politics 6: Legislative Markets and Organization 7: Pressure Groups 8: Bureaucratic Markets: Why Government Bureaucracies Are Efficient and Not Too Large 9: The Market for Regulation 10: The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract and the Role of Transaction Costs in Constitutional Design 11: Majority Rule and Preference Aggregation 12: The Distribution of Economic Wealth and Political Power 13: The Testing of Theory 14: Epilogue: The Burden of Proof References Author Index Subject index

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