Description
Book SynopsisChristopher Peacocke presents a philosophical theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation of such a subject of consciousness. He develops a new treatment of subjects, distinct from previous theories, under which subjects were regarded either as constructs from mental events, or fundamentally embodied, or Cartesian egos. In contrast, his theory of the first person integrates with the positive treatment of subjectsand it contributes to the explanation of various distinctive first person phenomena in the theory of thought and knowledge. These are issues on which contributions have been made by some of the greatest philosophers, and Peacocke brings his points to bear on the contributions to these issues made by Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, and Strawson. He also relates his position to the recent literature in the philosophy of mind, and then goes on to distinguish and characterize three varieties of self-consciousness. Perspe
Trade Review... this is a very rich and rewarding book -- required reading for anyone interested in the metaphysics and epistemology of the self. * Jose Luis Bermúdez, Philosophical Quarterly *
Peacocke's account of subjects is in many ways an appealing one . . . but also complex and multi-layered . . . the book is an impressive piece of work . . . Mirror would serve as an excellent introduction for those coming to Peacocke's writings for the first time. * Barry Dainton, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
Table of ContentsI: Introduction II: Primitive Self-Representation III: The Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects IV: The First Person Concept and Its Nonconceptual Parent V: Explaining First Person Phenomena VI: Descartes Defended VII: Paralogisms and First Person Illusions VIII: Perspectival Self-Consciousness IX: Reflective Self-Consciousness X: Interpersonal Self-Consciousness XI: Open Conclusion: The Place of Metaphysics References Index
