Description
Book SynopsisThis book comprehensively revises our understanding of the development of military theory and doctrine in the German army between the wars. It shows that military planning concentrated primarily on a defensive war against superior enemies with the German army too weak for most of the period to effectively repel invaders.
Trade Review'Strohn's stimulating study of German military thought during the interwar period ably tracks the development of a defensive doctrine in which the offensive remained paramount at the tactical level. It will appeal not only to military historians interested in the nuts and bolts of the tactical defensive but also to scholars more generally interested in military decision making and diplomacy during the interwar period.' Journal of Contemporary History
'Matthias Strohn's work is complex, detailed, and well situated. Moreover, the author deserves a great deal of credit for managing a huge cast of officers and politicians.' H-Soz-u-Kult
Table of ContentsIntroduction and definitions; Part I. The Foundations of Defensive Warfare in the Inter-War Period: 1. Defence doctrine before the First World War; 2. The lessons of the First World War; 3. Military planning in the aftermath of the First World War; Part II. The Seeckt Era: Years of Ignorance: 4. Hans von Seeckt and the rebirth of the offensive; 5. The manual Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen and the conduct of the defensive battle; Part III. Adapting to Reality 1923–33: 6. Military thought after the occupation of the Ruhr; 7. Civil-military co-operation; 8. The manual Truppenführung and the increased importance of defence; Part IV. Defensive Warfare in the Third Reich 1933–9: 9. Political ideology versus military reality: defensive warfare 1933–6; 10. The rebirth of offensive warfare 1936–9; Conclusion: the defensive battle in the Second World War and beyond.
