Description
Book SynopsisThis book explores the causes and implications of the Libyan crisis since the anti-Gaddafi uprisings of 2011 from the perspective of the EU and NATO.
It asks the question of why those organizations failed to stabilize the country despite the serious challenges posed by the protracted crisis to European and transatlantic stakes in the region. This book argues that such failure originated in a twofold problem common to both organizations: their prioritization of legitimacy over strategy, and their path dependence the insufficient degree of adaptation to meet the different needs of the crisis. Through a critical and integrated analysis of official sources and extensive interviews with EU, NATO, UN, and national government officials and militaries, as well as from NGO personnel, Libyan institutions and civil society, and media, the volume brings the perspective of both state and non-state actors to the fore. It reveals how wrong assumptions and centrifugal forces within the EU a
Table of Contents
Introduction Part 1: Responsibility to Protect 1. The EU and NATO on the Eve of the Libyan War: Strategy and Institutions 2. Bloody Spring: The Libya Conflict of 2011 3. Intervention: Half-Hearted Hard Power Part 2: Responsibility to Rebuild 4. The Years of Missed Opportunities: Soft Power to the Test, 2012–2014 5. Civil War and Proxy War: From Soft to Hard Security Crisis, 2015–2016 6. From State-Building to Containment: Eluding or Deputizing Hard Security Measures, 2017–2018 7. From a Proxy to an Internationalized War: The Need for Hard Power, 2019 and Beyond. Conclusions and Heading Forward
