Description
Book SynopsisCounterinsurgency is a doctrine premised on winning the population of a nation-state over to the government's side. Counterinsurgency is also associated with a continuing presence of military forces for long periods and significant aid expenditures. As such, it is a curious strategy to employ in the midst of wars seen as failing and when the population has turned against the conflict. This book examines counterinsurgency's emergence in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan in order to understand how it is employed in the midst of these perceived war fighting failures. In doing so, it thinks of strategy as narrative that describes how actions will result in better future effects. In so doing, this book traces the ways in which the strategy making process overcomes fragmentation to produce consensus. It concludes that through the examination of how actors, analogies, and narratives are produced and deployed into strategy debates, the reasons for counterinsurgency's emergence in crisis periods c
Trade ReviewEssence of Desperation does contribute to the ongoing debate on the merits of COIN. It compels the reader to consider the capabilities and limitations of COIN. It reminds us that COIN efforts must address grievances if they are to be successful. . . Essence of Desperation is a must read for policy makers and students of COIN. * Military Review *
The Essence of Desperation explains how a backwater irregular war doctrine came to be seen as the salvation for US war failures twice, only to fall out of fashion once again. Its a compelling study of the ways in which bureaucratic entrepreneurship, battlefield setbacks, and political desperation collided to produce the rise and fall of US counter-insurgency doctrine. -- Gerard Toal, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
This comparative analysis of how the United States became entangled in counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan is a “must read” book about national security, and today's on-going global war of terrorism. As a former US Army officer, and Pentagon staff planner, Riddle illustrates how orderly good governance is the decisive outcome needed to prevail against armed insurgents, even though US military forces are ill-suited for this missions. Thus America's counterinsurgency doctrines emerged in each of these conflicts from protracted warfighting failure and the domestic political doubt they create. Their advocates nonetheless prevail in Washington by dominating the key discourses about geostrategic space in Pentagon planning and politics. Unless counterinsurgency operations deliver the effective governance, secure services, and political stability needed to win the peace, the adoption of these doctrines largely signal the essence of desperation, marking how such wars are lost. -- Timothy W. Luke, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Table of ContentsPreface Acknowledgments Introduction Chapter 1: Analytical Framework Chapter 2: The Opening Act of U.S. Counterinsurgency: The Strategic Hamlet Program Chapter 3: Iraq: The Rebirth of Counterinsurgency Chapter 4: Afghanistan: COIN Challenged and Continued Conclusion Bibliography About the Author
