Description
Book SynopsisThe question, Why should I obey the law? introduces a contemporary puzzle that is as old as philosophy itself. The puzzle is especially troublesome if we think of cases in which breaking the law is not otherwise wrongful, and in which the chances of getting caught are negligible. Philosophers from Socrates to H.L.A. Hart have struggled to give reasoned support to the idea that we do have a general moral duty to obey the law but, more recently, the greater number of learned voices has expressed doubt that there is any such duty, at least as traditionally conceived. The thought that there is no such duty poses a challenge to our ordinary understanding of political authority and its legitimacy. In what sense can political officials have a right to rule us if there is no duty to obey the laws they lay down? Some thinkers, concluding that a general duty to obey the law cannot be defended, have gone so far as to embrace philosophical anarchism, the view that the state is necessarily illegit
Trade ReviewThis volume brings together the most important recent work on the question of political obligation. It is an excellent collection of the central work in the field... * Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy *
Edmundson's anthology is full of well-selected readings that define the range of the problem in its most current incarnation. His contributions and summaries are insightful and will promote valuable discussion. * Philosophy in Review *
Table of ContentsPart 1 Acknowledgments Part 2 Introduction Chapter 3 1 The Obligation to Obey the Law Chapter 4 2 The Justification of Civil Disobedience Chapter 5 3 The Conflict between Authority and Autonomy Chapter 6 4 Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law? Chapter 7 5 The Principle of Fair Play Chapter 8 6 Political Authority and Political Obligation Chapter 9 7 The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition Chapter 10 8 Legitimate Authority and the Duty to Obey Chapter 11 9 Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation Chapter 12 10 Legal Theory and the Claim of Authority Chapter 13 11 Freedom, Recognition, and Obligation: A Feminist Approach to Political Theory Chapter 14 12 Special Ties and Natural Duties Chapter 15 13 Who Believes in Political Obligation? Chapter 16 14 Surrender of Judgment and the Consent Theory of Political Authority Part 17 Index
