Description
Book SynopsisThis book is about normativity and reasons. By the end, however, the subject becomes the relation between self, thought, and world. If we understand normativity, we are on the road to understanding this relation. John Skorupski argues that all normative properties are reducible to reason relations, so that the sole normative ingredient in any normative concept is the concept of a reason. This is a concept fundamental to all thought. It is pervasive (actions, beliefs, and sentiments all fall within its range), primitive (all other normative concepts are reducible to it), and constitutive of the idea of thought itself. Thinking is sensitivity to reasons. Thought in the full sense of autonomous cognition is possible only for a being sensitive to reasons and capable of deliberating about them. In Part II of the book Skorupski examines epistemic reasons, and shows that aprioricity, necessity, evidence, and probability, which may not seem to be normative at all, are in fact normative concept
Trade ReviewReview from previous edition as historically rich as it is philosophically illuminating ... on a par with the most significant books on reasons, normativity and the mind published in recent years. * Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
Table of ContentsPART ONE THE STRUCTURE OF NORMATIVE CONCEPTS; PART TWO EPISTEMIC REASONS; PART THREE EVALUATIVE AND PRACTICAL REASONS; PART FOUR THE NORMATIVE VIEW
