Description
Book SynopsisThe Détente Deception examines the competition between the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet bloc in the less developed world during the final years of Détente. Rivero assesses whether or not the Soviet bloc pushed for strategic gains in the Third World and whether this contributed to the U.S. decision to abandon Détente in 1979. This view is articulated by many acclaimed scholars such as Stephen Walt (1992), John Gaddis (1997), and Vladislav Zubok (2007). They make the case that during the final years of Détente and throughout the 1980s, U.S. policy in places such as Nicaragua and Angola was a calculated response to Soviet aggression in the less-developed world. This book challenges this position as the quantitative evidence points to U.S. aggression. Not only did the Western bloc push to maintain dominance over the Third World, archival evidence also suggests the US made significant efforts in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan during the final years of Détente to dismantle the Sovie
Trade ReviewRivero offers a powerful analysis of US foreign policy during the final stages of Détente. His analysis of U.S. and Soviet archives is outstanding. -- David Gibbs Ph.D, professor of history, University of Arizona and author of First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia
An eye-opening and penetrating examination of the Cold War. -- Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago; author of The Origins of the Korean War
Lucid and incisive. The Détente Deception is an important inquiry into U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Rivero’s book is distinctive in its theoretical and empirical sweep. -- Ronald Cox, associate professor of political science, Florida International University, author of
Power and Profits: US Policy in Central America.
Table of ContentsList of Tables Abstract I. Introduction and Methodology II. The Soviet Aggression Thesis and its Critics III. Soviet and Western Bloc Foreign Aid to the Less Developed World IV. The Soviet Response in the Third World V. The U.S. Response to the Soviet Threat in the Third World VI. Consequences of Détente: Collapse of USSR VII. Conclusion and Final Thoughts
