Description
Book SynopsisThe Atlas of REALITY The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics presents an extensive examination of the key concepts, principles, and arguments of metaphysics, traditionally the very core of philosophical thought. Representing the first exhaustive survey of metaphysics available, the book draws from historic sources while presenting the latest cutting-edge research in the field. Seminal works of philosophers such as David Lewis, Alvin Plantinga, Kit Fine, Peter van Inwagen, John Hawthorne and many others are covered in depth, without neglecting the critical contributions of historical figures like René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Bertrand Russell, and more. Written in an accessible manner without sacrificing rigor, readers at all levels will gain illuminating insights into metaphysical topics ranging from the problem of universals, individuation and composition, and relations and qualities, to time, space, causation, existence, modality, and idealism. The aut
Table of ContentsAcknowledgements xvii
Part I Foundations
1 Introduction 3
1.1 A Brief History of Metaphysics 3
1.2 Why Do Metaphysics? 5
1.3 How to Use the Book 9
2 Truthmakers 13
2.1 Introduction 13
2.2 Five Arguments for Classical Truthmaker Theory 19
2.3 The Challenge of Deflationism 25
2.4 Truthmaker Maximalism 30
2.5 Alternatives to Truthmaker Maximalism 36
2.6 Conclusion and Preview 44
Notes 45
3 Grounding, Ontological Dependence, and Fundamentality 47
3.1 Is Grounding Real? 49
3.2 Relation between Grounding and Truthmaking 55
3.3 Relation between Grounding and Ontological Dependence 58
3.4 Conceptual vs. Extra-Conceptual Grounding 62
3.5 Alternatives to Grounding? 65
3.6 Can Grounding Relations be Grounded? 69
3.7 Connections between Grounding and Entailment 71
3.8 How is Grounding Different from Causal Explanation? 72
3.9 Conclusion: Grounding and Ontological Economy 72
Notes 73
Part II Dispositions
4 Conditionals 77
4.1 Counterfactual Conditionals: Semantics, Logic, and Metaphysics 78
4.2 Hypotheticalism 84
4.3 Anti-Hypotheticalism and Laws of Nature 86
4.4 Strong Hypotheticalism: Counterfactual Accounts of Powers and Dispositions 90
Notes 92
5 Laws of Nature 94
5.1 Strong Nomism: The Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley (DAT) Theory of Laws 94
5.2 Neo-Humeism: Reduction of Conditionals, Laws, and Powers 99
Notes 105
6 Powers and Properties 106
6.1 Advantages of Strong Powerism 106
6.2 The Individuation of Properties 108
6.3 Objections to Strong Powerism 118
6.4 Conclusion 121
Notes 121
Part III Universals and Particulars
7 Universals 125
7.1 Introduction 125
7.1.1 What properties must explain 126
7.2 Realism 128
7.3 Universals and the Problem of Intentionality 142
7.4 Properties as the Ground of Causal Powers 145
Notes 145
8 Reductive Nominalism and Trope Theory 147
8.1 Reductive Nominalism 147
8.2 Trope Theory 165
8.3 Conclusion 169
Notes 169
9 Particulars and the Problem of Individuation 171
9.1 Introduction 171
9.2 Facts 172
9.3 Substances 175
Notes 200
10 Relations, Structures, and Quantities 201
10.1 Accounts of Relational Facts 201
10.2 Non-Symmetrical Relations and the Problem of Order 206
10.3 Structural Universals and Constituent Ontology 215
10.4 Determinables, Quantities, and Real Numbers 219
10.5 Conclusion and Preview 225
Notes 225
Part IV The Nature of Reality
11 Nihilism and Monism 229
11.1 Nihilism and Aliquidism 229
11.2 Monism 237
Note 252
12 The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existing 253
12.1 Does Everything Exist? 253
12.2 Ontic Vagueness 271
12.3 Conclusion 280
13 Solipsism, Idealism, and the Problem of Perception 281
13.1 Defining the Mental and the External 282
13.2 Solipsism and Phenomenalism 284
13.3 Theories of Perception 286
13.4 Arguments against Phenomenalism 306
13.5 Arguments against Solipsism 309
13.6 Conclusion and Preview 312
Notes 313
Part V Modality
14 Possibility, Necessity, and Actuality: Concretism 317
14.1 Introduction 317
14.2 Concretism:Worlds as Universes 321
14.3 Problems for Concretism 327
14.4 Conclusion 331
Note 331
15 Abstractionism:Worlds as Representations 332
15.1 Magical Abstractionism 333
15.2 Structural Abstractionism 341
15.3 Aristotelian Theories of Possibility 348
15.4 Conclusion 350
Note 351
16 De Re Modality and Modal Knowledge 352
16.1 Modality De Re: Transworld Identity and Counterpart Theory 352
16.2 Modality and Epistemology: Possibility and Conceivability 363
16.3 Conclusion 369
Notes 369
Part VI Space and Time
17 Is Space Merely Relational? 373
17.1 The Nature of Location 373
17.2 Spatial Substantivalism 375
17.3 Spatial Relationism 381
17.4 Absences and Vacuums 386
17.5 Conclusion 388
Notes 389
18 Structure of Space: Points vs. Regions 390
18.1 Constructing Points from Regions 391
18.2 Points vs. Regions 394
18.3 Arguments against Points as Fundamental 397
18.4 Voluminism vs. Volume-Boundary Dualism 408
18.5 Conclusion 414
Note 414
19 The Structure of Time 415
19.1 Is Time Composed of Instants or Intervals? 415
19.2 Instants as Dependent Entities 425
19.3 Does Time have a Beginning? 427
19.4 Conclusion 429
20 Time’s Passage 430
20.1 Tensers and Anti-Tensers 432
20.2 Varieties of Anti-Tensism 435
20.3 Varieties of Tensism 437
20.4 Presentism 439
20.5 Arguments for Tensism 442
20.6 Conclusion 456
Note 457
21 Arguments for Anti-Tensism 458
21.1 How Fast Does Time Flow? 458
21.2 Truthmakers for Truths about the Past 461
21.3 The Theory of Relativity 469
21.4 Epistemological Problems for Tensism 473
21.5 McTaggart’s Paradox 474
21.6 Brute Necessities of Time 476
21.7 Conclusion 478
Part VII Unity
22 Material Composition: The Special Question 481
22.1 The Existence of Composite Things 482
22.2 Are Composite Things an “Ontological Free Lunch”? 482
22.3 Redundancy 485
22.4 Fundamental Heaps 490
22.5 Fundamental Artifacts 497
22.6 Living Organisms vs. Mereological Nihilism 499
22.7 Finding an Intelligible Principle of Composition 504
Notes 513
23 Composition: The General Question 514
23.1 Formal Mereology: Le´sniewski, Goodman, and Leonard 514
23.2 Three (or Four) Answers to the General Composition Question 518
23.3 Accounting for the Correct Principles of Mereology 523
23.4 Parthood and Truthmaking 529
Notes 530
24 Change and Persistence 531
24.1 Does Anything Change? Does Anything Persist? 532
24.2 How Objects Change Properties: Substratism vs. Replacementism 537
24.3 The Metaphysics of Motion 551
Notes 554
25 The Persistence of Composite Things 555
25.1 Mereological Constancy and Inconstancy 556
25.2 Coincident Things 564
25.3 Conclusion 573
Note 574
Part VIII Causation
26 The Existence and Scope of Causation 577
26.1 Are there Causes? 577
26.2 The Scope of Causation 583
Note 589
27 Causation: A Relation between Things or Truths? 591
27.1 Causal Explanationism 592
27.2 Causal Connectionism 605
Notes 611
28 Discrete and Continuous Causation 613
28.1 Is All Causation Discrete? 614
28.2 The Nature of Discrete Causation 614
28.3 Is All Causation Continuous? 616
28.4 The Nature of Continuous Processes 618
28.5 Processes and the Direction of Continuous Causation 621
28.6 Are Processes an Exception to Hume’s Epistemic Principle? 622
28.7 Conclusion: The Consequences of Causation 623
Notes 623
29 Conclusion: The Four Packages 624
Appendix A 633
Appendix B 651
References 655
Index 671
