Description
Book SynopsisSocial Phenomenology offers an account of collective intentionality informed by the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology. The account argues that if consciousness and intentionality are only intrinsic to individuals, denying collectivism, that it does not follow that one endorses an atomistic conception of the subject.
Trade ReviewThe question of intersubjectivity was perhaps one of the most debated and attended-to philosophical problems of the last century. But what is really interesting about it is the fact that the same question seems to play a pivotal role in both analytical and continental (phenomenological) traditions which otherwise appear to continually drift away from each other, or try to sever all connections to one another in their attempt to assert their self-sufficiency. And this alleged self-sufficiency is precisely what Eric Chelstrom is trying to overcome in his clear and well-argued work on intersubjectivity and collective intentionality, which attempts to develop a solid and productive dialogue between the two philosophical perspectives. ... By successfully using the compass of clear-cut Husserlian terminology, Chelstrom succeeds in finding his way through the dangerous and murky waters of social phenomenology, not only avoiding the hazards of the established analytical perspectives on the same matter, but also constructing a bridge between the two antagonistic traditions which invites other thinkers belonging to the said traditions of thought to cross it for the sake of "the things themselves". * Metapsychology Online *
Social Phenomenology is a valuable addition to recent literature that juxtaposes the traditions of Phenomenology and Analytic philosophy. Chelstrom develops a Husserlian approach to issues of collective intentionality and social ontology, defending the view from critics within the Phenomenological tradition (such as Sartre and Heidegger) and presenting it as a viable alternative to prominent analytic accounts. The book provides a clear introduction to central elements of phenomenology while also showing how dialogue between different traditions can shed new light on shared problems. It will be of interest to scholars working on issues related to social ontology and collective intentionality, and also to those looking for an advanced introduction to phenomenology as it applies to the social domain. -- Andrew D. Spear, Grand Valley State University
In this well-researched and clearly written book, Chelstom provides a model for showing how Continental philosophers can contribute to debates in analytic philosophy. Chelstom expertly walks the line between the irreducibility of we-intentions and the denial of plural subjects, presenting an account of collective intentionality more plausible than rival accounts. -- David Vessey, Grand Valley State University
Table of ContentsTable of Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Chapter 1: That Experience Does Not Motivate a Robust Claim for Collective Consciousness Chapter 2: A Metaphysical Critique of the Notion of Collective Consciousness Chapter 3: Plural Subjects: Phenomenology and Collective Intentionality Chapter 4: Responding to Criticisms: Phenomenological Evidence and Horizon Intentionality Chapter 5: The Phenomenology of the Social World and Gilbert’s Plural Subject Theory Chapter 6: Responses to Two Criticisms Motivated by Realist Concerns Chapter 7: Responding to Sokolowski’s Criticism of Husserlian Individualism Bibliography About the Author
