Description
Book SynopsisThe risks of arms control and disarmament, how they can be reduced or eliminated, and the political implications of drastic disarmament are analyzed by eleven experts. Emphasis is placed on the development of techniques for disarming that are politically feasible and give reasonable assurance to each side that the other is not violating its obligat
Table of Contents*Frontmatter, pg. i*Preface, pg. v*Contents, pg. vii*Introduction, pg. 1*Introduction to Part One, pg. 11*I. Inspection: Shadow and Substance, pg. 15*II. Inspection, Trust, and Security during Disarmament, pg. 37*III. Verification of Reductions in the Number of Strategic Delivery Vehicles, pg. 50*IV. Verification Requirements for a Production Cutoff of Weapons-Grade Fissionable Material, pg. 69*V. Organization of a "Mixed" National and International Inspectorate, pg. 80*VI. Inspection and the Problem of Access, pg. 107*VII. The Politics of Administering Disarmament, pg. 123*VIII. The Cuban Crisis and Disarmament: Implications for Inspection and Enforcement, pg. 139*Introduction to Part Two, pg. 155*IX. Violations of Disarmament Agreements, pg. 157*X. Responses to Violations: A General Survey, pg. 178*XI. Respect for International Law and Confidence in Disarmament, pg. 204*XII. The Limitations of Inspection for Drastic Disarmament, pg. 226*XIII. International Police: A Sequential Approach to Effectiveness and Control, pg. 240*XIV. The Role of Police Forces in Response to Violations, pg. 286*XV. The Impartiality of the International Police, pg. 320*Introduction to Part Three, pg. 343*XVI. Provision for Peaceful Change in a Disarming World, pg. 347*XVII. Conflicting National Interests in Alternative Disarmed Worlds, pg. 361*XVIII. Supranational versus International Models for General and Complete Disarmament, pg. 384*Appendix, pg. 411*Contributors, pg. 427*Selected Bibliography, pg. 429*Index, pg. 431*Backmatter, pg. 441
