Description
Book SynopsisWhy do political elites in authoritarian regimes, even within the same country, engage in different levels of predatory behavior, whereby some foster vibrant capitalism and others suffocate the innovative private sector? This book proposes a theory of localized property-rights protection under authoritarianism. By combining in-depth fieldwork with archival research and quantitative data analysis, Qi Zhang and Mingxing Liu discuss the post-1949 conflicts between dominant and marginalized factions in the Chinese province of Zhejiang. These conflicts resulted in systemic vulnerabilities among the marginalized local cadres, thus motivating them to form alliances with their grassroots constituents. They therefore provided their constituents with quasi-public goods, such as property-rights protection, to increase their odds of political survival. Zhang and Liu argue that this framework can apply both to the Mao era and to the current reform era, and it also can be extended beyond China to a
Table of Contents1. Introduction; 2. Revolutionary history in Zhejiang province and its political consequences; 3. The dog that did not bark: grassroots resistance to socialist agricultural collectivization; 4. United in the cultural revolution: the return of capitalism; 5. Capitalism with Zhejiang characteristics: crossing the river by feeling for the stones; 6. Beyond Zhejiang: the Zhejiang model versus Jiangsu province; 7. Discussion and conclusions: rethinking the power structure, the government-business relationship, and the future of the private economy; Appendices; Bibliography; Index.
