Description
Book SynopsisHow does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? This book attempts to answer this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. It explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment.
Trade ReviewWinner of the 2008 Giovanni Sartori Award, for the Best Book Developing or Applying Qualitative Methods Published in 2007 "In an extraordinarily well-researched and very interesting book on the not so interesting subject of sovereign debt, Michael Tomz shows that contrary to popular belief and several dominant theories, states do now and have always cared about their international financial reputations."--Anastasia Xenias, Political Science Quarterly "Tomz has gathered a large amount of quantitative and qualitative historical evidence from archives and libraries in nine countries. International historians can benefit both from reading his case studies and from thinking about the role of market forces in international relations in the light of his theory on sovereign debt."--G.C. Peden, The International History Review
Table of ContentsList of Tables ix List of Figures xi Preface xiii PART ONE: THEORY 1 Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt 3 Chapter 2: A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation 14 PART TWO: EVIDENCE 37 Chapter 3: Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers 39 Chapter 4: Reputation in Expert Opinion 70 Chapter 5: Reputations during Good Times and Bad 86 Chapter 6: Enforcement by Gunboats 114 Chapter 7: Enforcement through Trade Sanctions 158 Chapter 8: Enforcement through Collective Retaliation 196 PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS 221 Chapter 9: Reputation and Cooperation under Anarchy 223 Bibliography 243 Index 275
