Description
Book SynopsisIn Reliability and Alliance Interdependence, Iain D. Henry argues for a more sophisticated approach to alliance politics and ideas of interdependence.
It is often assumed that if the United States failed to defend an ally, then this disloyalty would instantly and irrevocably damage US alliances across the globe. Henry proposes that such damage is by no means inevitable and that predictions of disaster are dangerously simplistic. If other allies fear the risks of military escalation more than the consequences of the United States abandoning an ally, then they will welcome, encourage, and even praise such an instance of disloyalty. It is also often assumed that alliance interdependence only constrains US policy options, but Henry shows how the United States can manipulate interdependence to set an example of what constitutes acceptable allied behavior.
Using declassified documents, Henry explores five case studies involving US alliances with S
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. Alliances, Reliability, and Interdependence
2. Forming Alliances in Asia, 1949-1951
3. Unleashing and Re-leashing Chiang Kai-shek, 1953-1954
4. Allies Encourage Limits on US Loyalty to Formosa, 1954-1955
5. Revision of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, 1955-1960
6. Negotiating the Reversion of Okinawa, 1967-1969
Conclusion
