Description
Book SynopsisThis is a collection of very recent essays by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.
Table of ContentsIntroduction ; 1. What Is Justified Belief? ; 2. Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism ; 3. Reliabilism ; 4. Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification ; 5. Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism ; 6. Reliabilism and Value of Knowledge (with Erik Olsson) ; 7. Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence ; 8. Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement ; 9. A Guide to Social Epistemology ; 10. Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology ; 11. Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology
