Description
Book SynopsisBuilding on Oliver Williamson's original analysis, the contributors introduce new ideas, different perspectives and provide tools for better understanding changes in the approach to regulation, the reform of public utilities, and the complex problems of governance. They draw largely upon a transaction cost approach, highlighting the challenges faced by major economic sectors and identifying critical flaws in prevailing views on regulation. Deeply rooted in sector analysis, the book conveys a central message of new institutional economics: that theory should be continuously confronted by facts, and reformed or revolutionized accordingly.
With its emphasis on the institutional embeddedness of regulatory issues and the problems generated by the 'benign neglect' of institutional factors in the reform of major public utilities, this book will provide a wide-ranging audience with challenging views on the dynamics of regulatory approaches. Economists, political scientists, postgraduate students, researchers and policymakers with an interest in institutional economics and economic organization will find the book to be a stimulating and enlightening read.
Trade Review'After 25 years of industry restructuring, regulatory reform and deregulation across many industrial sectors in many countries, it is an appropriate time to take stock of the impacts of these reforms on consumers, producers and overall economic performance. This book contains the latest thinking on these issues by a distinguished international group of scholars. It's a collection of essays for our time that is well worth reading.' -- Paul L. Joskow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US
'The most exciting development in the study of regulation in the past quarter century is research on the incentives that are created by the details of the procedures for creating and enforcing regulatory rules. This book brings together a rich collection of studies that collectively advance our understanding of the effect of regulatory governance on the performance of regulated firms, with important lessons about how to design more effective regulatory instruments and processes.' -- Roger G. Noll, Stanford University, US
'Cycles of poorly-designed or weakly-enforced regulation, disappointing performance and political over-reaction are now familiar to students of regulated industries. Nourished by recent developments in the economics of incentives, including their transaction costs and property rights dimensions, and written by renowned experts in the field, Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation
is a must-read for all those interested in the economics and politics of regulation. A timely book, the publication of which coincides with the designing of a post-subprime regulatory framework for the financial industry.' -- Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics, France
Table of ContentsContents: Introduction Claude Ménard PART I: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 1. Transaction Cost Economics: The Precursors Oliver E. Williamson 2. Property Rights Allocation of Common Pool Resources Gary D. Libecap 3. An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications Pablo T. Spiller 4. Incentives and Transaction Costs in Public Procurement Steven Tadelis 5. From Technical Integrity to Institutional Coherence: Regulatory Challenges in the Water Sector Claude Ménard PART II: GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 6. Regulatory Governance and Sector Performance: Methodology and Evaluation for Electricity Distribution in Latin America Luis Andres, José Luis Guasch and Sebastián Lopez Azumendi 7. Vertical Relations and ‘Neutrality’ in Broadband Communications: Neither Market nor Hierarchy? Howard A. Shelanski 8. Deregulation, Efficiency and Environmental Performance: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry Magali A. Delmas, Michael V. Russo, Maria J. Montes-Sancho and Yesim Tokat 9. The Achievement of Electricity Competitive Reforms: A Governance Structure Problem? Jean-Michel Glachant and Yannick Perez 10. The US Postal Service R. Richard Geddes PART III: ADAPTATION AND CHANGES 11. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act at a Crossroads Roberta Romano 12. Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Rate-Making: Case Study Evidence from Commonwealth Edison and Duke Energy Rate Reviews Adam Fremeth and Guy L.F. Holburn 13. Adaptation in Long-term Exchange Relations: Evidence from Electricity Marketing Contracts Dean V. Williamson 14. Why and How Should New Industries with High Consumer Switching Costs be Regulated? The Case of Broadband Internet in France Jackie Krafft and Evens Salies 15. The Puzzle of Regulation, Deregulation and Reregulation Michel Ghertman Index
