Description
Book SynopsisProviding an alternative to conventional arguments grounded in public choice theory, this book demonstrates that regulatory government can, and on various occasions does, advance general interests.
Trade Review"Croley has done much more than write a lucid and learned book. His analysis of the behavior of agencies is an important contribution to our understanding of government regulation... His argument that agencies possess autonomy stands as a lasting contribution to our grasp of regulatory action... Croley has written an important and creative book. Agenda number one of this book--a serious critique of public choice theory--is successful in many ways. With great care, Croley lays out the elements of the theory and systematically critiques it. Such a comprehensive corrective is long overdue."--M. Elizabeth Magill, Michigan Law Review "Steven Croley ... has written an ambitious and valuable book... The book should be illuminating and useful for political scientists and legal scholars interested in regulatory policy, the politics of regulation, public administration, and administrative law. Regulation and Public Interests would be an excellent book for graduate courses in any of those fields."--Robert A. Kagan, Law & Politics Book Review
Table of ContentsAcknowledgments ix Introduction: An Uneasy Commitment to Regulatory Government 1 PART I: THE CYNICAL VIEW OF REGULATORY GOVERNMENT, AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 7 Chapter One; The Basic Project 9 Chapter Two: The Cynical View of Regulation 14 Chapter Three: Is Regulatory Capture Inevitable? 26 Chapter Four: Alternative Visions of Regulatory Government 53 PART II: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY STATE 77 Chapter Five: Opening the Black Box: Regulatory Decisionmaking in Legal Context 81 Chapter Six: Regulatory Government as Administrative Government 102 Chapter Seven: Participation in Administrative Decisionmaking 118 Chapter Eight: The Administrative-Process Approach Expanded: A More Developed Picture 134 PART III: PUBLIC INTERESTED REGULATION 157 Chapter Nine: The Environmental Protection Agency's Ozone and Particulate Matter Rules 163 Chapter Ten: The Food and Drug Administration's Tobacco Initiative 180 Chapter Eleven: The Forest Service's Roadless Policy for National Forests 196 Chapter Twelve: Socially Beneficial Administrative Decisionmaking: Additional Evidence 213 PART IV: PUBLIC CHOICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 237 Chapter Thirteen: The Public Choice Theory Revisited 241 Chapter Fourteen: The Promise of an Administrative-Process Orientation 258 Chapter Fifteen: Regulatory Rents, Regulatory Failures, and Other Objections 284 Conclusion: The Regulatory State and Social Welfare 304 Notes 307 Index 365
