Description
Book SynopsisFor decades the European Union tried changing its institutions, but achieved only unsatisfying political compromises and modest, incremental treaty revisions. In late 2009, however, the EU was successfully reformed through the Treaty of Lisbon. This title examines how political leaders ratified this treaty against all odds.
Trade Review"This theoretically rich and empirically driven study by Finke, Konig, Proksch, and Tseblis continues the scholarly discussion on the institutional reforms within the EU."--Choice "This book is an achievement in terms of the application of formal models and the collection of new data."--Erik Jones, Survival "[T]his is a smart, sophisticated analysis that contains much to admire. There can be no doubt that Reforming the European Union is a great book that all students of treaty revisions in the EU will have to read and engage with."--Mareike Kleine, Review of International Organisation "[T]his is an excellent book for students of EU politics, particularly for those who want to understand EU Treaty change. The book would also be useful for students of political science in general concerning its up to date methods, which can also be rigorously applied in certain domestic settings."--Senem Aydin-Duzgit, Insight Turkey
Table of ContentsList of Figures xi List of Tables xiii Acknowledgments xv Introduction 1 Chapter One: From the European Convention to the Lisbon Agreement and Beyond: A Veto Player Analysis By George Tsebelis 28 1.1 Judges, Bureaucrats, and the Democratic Deficit 32 1.2 Veto Players and Their Policy and Institutional Implications 38 1.3 A Qualified Majority in the Council: To What Extent Does It Impede Decision Making? 45 1.4 Battles over the "Default Solution" 54 1.5 Conclusion 60 Chapter Two: Revealing Constitutional Preferences in the European Convention By Sven-OliverProksch 62 2.1 Revealing Preferences: Cosponsorship of Amendments in the European Convention 64 2.2 Data and Method 68 2.3 Results: Giscard's Central Position within the Conflict Space 70 2.4 Conclusion 75 Chapter Three: The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention By George Tsebelis and Sven-Oliver Proksch 76 3.1 Limiting the Number of Amendments 78 3.2 Shaping Amendments 88 3.3 The Absence of Voting 94 3.4 Discussion and Conclusion 95 Appendix 3A 97 Appendix 3B 99 Chapter Four: Actors and Positions on the Reform of the Treaty of Nice By Thomas Konig and Daniel Finke 103 4.1 The Process of Reform: From the Convention to the Ratification Stage 107 4.2 The Two-dimensional Space and the Location of the Political Leaders' Positions 111 4.3 Other Actors and the Cohesiveness of the Political Leaders' Positions 116 4.4 Representing and Delegating the Position of Political Leaders 120 4.5 The Ratifiers: Median Voters and Political Parties 125 4.6 Summary 127 Chapter Five: Why (Unpopular) Leaders Announce Popular Votes By Thomas Konig and Daniel Finke 129 5.1 Political Leaders and Their Announcements of Referendums 132 5.2 Ratification Hurdles in Each Country 134 5.3 Decisions along the Ratification Path: A Strategic Consideration 137 5.4 The Empirical Analysis of Referendum Announcements 142 5.5 From Announcing Referendums to a Reflection Period and Reform Crisis 147 Chapter Six: Principals and Agents: From the Convention's Proposal to the Constitutional Treaty By Thomas Konig and Daniel Finke 151 6.1 The Setup for Intergovernmental Bargaining 154 6.2 The Reaction to Failure: Delegating the Negotiation Mandate 158 6.3 How Drifting Agents Enabled a Disagreeable Compromise 160 6.4 From Compromising Agents to the Defeat by the Vote of the Irish 166 Chapter Seven: In the Aftermath of the Negative Referendums: The Irish Resistance By Thomas Konig and Daniel Finke 170 7.1 The Strategy of the German Presidency 173 7.2 Moderate but Well-directed Concessions 177 7.3 From Treaty Reform to Constitution Building, and Back 184 Conclusion 188 Appendix: Research Design and Methodology By Thomas Konig and Sven-Oliver Proksch 199 References 209 Index 221
